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WHAT IF YOU COULD SUE YOUR HMO? 
MANAGED CARE LIABILITY BEYOND THE ERISA SHIELD 
GAIL B. AGRAWAL* AND MARK A. HALL** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
From the bright red cover of Time Magazine to the smudged ink pages of 
student newspapers, headlines have trumpeted the news that “you can’t sue 
your HMO.”1  While never literally true, the more accurate statement—a 
managed-care enrollee’s ability to prevail in a lawsuit against a managed care 
organization can depend upon complex factors unrelated to the merits of the 
case—is somewhat harder to capture in a headline and considerably less likely 
to grab the attention of the average reader.  While the public has lamented the 
alleged inability to hold managed care organizations legally accountable for 
their actions, courts and health law scholars have devoted countless pages to 
deciphering the complexities of when and where disgruntled enrollees could 
seek legal redress for harm. 
Some rules are straightforward.  Individuals who obtain their health care 
coverage from a private employer-sponsored health benefit plan can enforce 
their contract rights to plan benefits in federal court under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).2  ERISA plan beneficiaries, 
however, cannot recover consequential personal injury or punitive damages in 
such suits.3  The ability to seek damages or injunctive relief under state law has 
 
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, School of Law.  The authors 
thank Shannon Buckner, University of North Carolina Law School class of 2004, for research 
assistance, and the symposium participants for helpful comments. 
** Fred D. and Elizabeth L. Professor of Law and Public Health, Wake Forest University.  A 
portion of this work was funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, through its program on 
Changes in Health Care Financing and Organization.  In the past, I have consulted with both 
plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers on liability issues. 
 1. Robert F. Howe, The People vs. HMOs, TIME, Feb. 1, 1999, at 46. 
 2. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1426 (2000).  A full discussion of ERISA is beyond the scope of 
this Article.  For an excellent discussion of these issues, see Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. 
Pomfret, Form, Function, and Managed Care Torts: Achieving Fairness and Equity in ERISA 
Jurisprudence, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 985 (1998). 
 3. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000).  See also Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 
(1993) (extra contractual damages not recoverable in ERISA action). 
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been curtailed by ERISA’s preemption of state laws that relate to such plans.4  
The degree of curtailment depends upon the theory of liability.  At least since 
the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 
Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.,5 theories of vicarious liability for the 
negligence of treating physicians have not been preempted in most 
jurisdictions.6  Yet, it is undeniable that ERISA has significantly restricted the 
abilities of plan beneficiaries to seek damages for the conduct of managed care 
organizations, including medical necessity decisions, medical management 
policies, or other coverage determinations that affect the care received by a 
beneficiary.7 
Courts and commentators alike have addressed the wisdom, or lack 
thereof, of shielding managed care organizations from state law remedies.8  
Comparatively less substantive attention has been afforded, however, to 
analyzing or adjudicating the merits of such suits.9  In large part, this is 
because so few survived preemption, and of those that did, many were settled 
by managed care organizations to avoid establishing unfavorable precedents. 
Recently, the legal environment that has afforded managed care 
organizations protection from liability for cost containment activities has 
begun to change, and their risk of liability under state law has begun to 
increase.  Various legal doctrines have created cracks in the ERISA shield.  
Some states are attempting to circumvent ERISA preemption through statutory 
declarations of managed care liability, and preemption may fall altogether if 
legislation pending in Congress for several years is ever enacted.  This Article 
 
 4. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000) (“the provisions of this title . . . shall supersede any and all 
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan”).  Similar 
forms of preemption may apply to private insurers who contract with Medicare or the Federal 
Employee Health Benefits Program, although this issue has not yet been resolved.  See Ardary v. 
Aetna Health Plans of Cal., Inc., 98 F.3d 496, 501 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding no preemption under 
Medicare).  ERISA preemption does not apply, however, to health insurance purchased outside 
the workplace, or for insurance provided by religious institutions, and by state and local 
governments for their employees. 
 5. 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995).  See discussion infra notes 50-53. 
 6. See, e.g., Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 646 (7th Cir. 1995) (vicarious liability claims not 
preempted); Ray v. Value Behavioral Health, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 417, 423-24 (D. Nev. 1997) 
(same); Yanez v. Humana Med. Plan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 1314, 1316 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (same). 
 7. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(ERISA preempts state law wrongful death claim in which parents allege medical necessity 
coverage determination proximately caused the death of their unborn child). 
 8. See, e.g., Wendy K. Mariner, Slouching Toward Managed Care Liability: Reflections on 
Doctrinal Boundaries, Paradigm Shifts, and Incremental Reform, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 253 
(2001) (favoring enhanced liability); David A. Hyman, Accountable Managed Care: Should We 
Be Careful What We Wish For?, 32 MICH. J. L. REFORM  785 (1999) (opposing enhanced state 
law liability).  See also Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1997) 
(state law claim preempted by ERISA). 
 9. But see E. HAVVI MORREIM, HOLDING HEALTH CARE ACCOUNTABLE (2001). 
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looks ahead to a time when it will be possible to sue managed care 
organizations for a broader range of managed care activities, and it considers 
how legislatures and courts should develop the law that will govern these new 
causes of action.10  It does so by combining conventional legal analysis with 
empirical findings from a large number of confidential interviews with 
experienced health care lawyers, health plan managers, and industry 
observers.11 
Part II of the Article explains why managed care liability exposure has 
been low and why it is increasing.  Part III briefly outlines the costs and 
benefits of enhanced liability of managed care organizations to provide a guide 
for those who would create the law that governs the merits of these suits.  Part 
IV describes the new liability statutes enacted by states and proposed in 
Congress, and explains their differing scopes and standards of liability.  In Part 
V, a framework is developed for the adjudication of lawsuits challenging the 
clinically based actions taken by managed care organizations. 
II.  THE CONFUSING AND CHANGING FACE OF MANAGED CARE LIABILITY 
A. Liability Risk Viewed from the Trenches 
A confluence of events has increased the potential risk of liability for 
managed care organizations: (1) State courts have indicated their willingness to 
extend common-law theories of institutional negligence and vicarious liability, 
originally developed to expand hospital liability, to managed care 
 
 10. In this Article, we use the terms “health plan” or “health insurer” interchangeably with 
“managed care organization” or “health maintenance organization” (HMO).  For many of the 
issues, it is not necessary to distinguish among different types of health insurance, and in our 
interviews it was common to refer to managed care insurers as health plans.  Also, we do 
differentiate between the primary health insurer and those entities to which the insurer may have 
delegated some or all of its managed care functions, but we do not consider situations where an 
employer may retain some of these functions.  These are important complexities, but they fall 
outside the scope of this Article. 
 11. Because of the confidentiality protections given to these research subjects, their 
identities cannot be revealed through citations to particular interviews that support various 
statements in this Article.  Instead, this Article itself is the original report of these research 
findings.  This research was conducted in  2002, and consisted of two focus groups and a variety 
of interviews with eighty-four subjects, including twenty-one in-house lawyers with health plans 
(seven national and fourteen more locally or regionally focused), forty-seven managed care 
executives or advisors, ten independent defense-oriented lawyers (mainly representing health 
plans), twenty-three plaintiffs’ lawyers or patient advocates, and thirteen other market participants 
or observers (for example, regulators or industry analysts).  About half of these interviews 
focused on liability issues in one of the six states we selected for in-depth study: Iowa, Louisiana, 
Michigan, New Jersey, Virginia and Texas.  Half of these states (Louisiana, New York and 
Texas) have managed care liability statutes.  The rest of the interviews addressed liability issues 
nationally or in a scattering of ten other specific states, including four other states with managed 
care liability statutes (California, Georgia, North Carolina and Oklahoma). 
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organizations; (2) the United States Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of 
ERISA preemption of state law, and in doing so has left a trail of puzzling 
dicta that appears to lead inexorably to greater liability exposure under state 
law; (3) State legislatures have accepted the Court’s invitation to create new 
theories of liability and causes of action for individuals harmed by managed 
care cost containment initiatives, while Congress repeatedly flirts with its own 
version of expanded liability; (4) the “managed care backlash” has created a 
social environment conducive to such lawsuits;12 and (5) a group of prominent 
plaintiffs’ lawyers, flush from victories over tobacco companies, has brought 
large class action suits against the major national managed care organizations 
under both ERISA and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (RICO), the federal white-collar crime statute.13 
This series of events has produced a complicated, evolving, and somewhat 
dichotomized liability landscape.14  This is reflected in the contrasting views 
 
 12. See Clark C. Havighurst, The Backlash Against Managed Health Care: Hard Politics 
Make Bad Policy, 34 IND. L. REV. 395 (2001) (analyzing the backlash against managed care 
organizations).  Not even the judiciary is immune from negative views of managed care 
organizations.  See, e.g., Wagner v. Magellan Health Servs., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 302, 304 (N.D. 
Ill. 2000) (“Magellan behaved like the stereotypical HMO, with a beady eye on the bottom line 
and stony indifference to patient welfare. . . .”). 
 13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).  These class actions allege that HMOs systematically 
misrepresent how generous they are in making coverage decisions and that they fail to disclose 
utilization review restrictions and methods of physician payment.  These non-disclosures are also 
alleged to violate fiduciary principles under the ERISA statute itself.  Physicians have brought 
another set of class action suits in which they use a variety of state common law theories, as well 
as the federal statutes, to claim various economic injuries under their contracts with HMOs.  So 
far, the only federal appellate decision has dismissed the RICO claims based on the plaintiffs’ 
failure to allege any injury cognizable under the statute.  The plaintiffs in that case claimed only 
that, due to managed care practices, their insurance policies had a lower market value than their 
employers paid for them, and not that they had suffered any actual denial of services.  See Maio 
v. Aetna, Inc. 221 F.3d 472 (3d Cir. 2000).  However, a lower court ruling has indicated that 
various legal theories under both RICO and ERISA, especially those in the physician class action 
suits, may be viable.  In re Managed Care Litigation, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1259 (S.D. Fla. 
2001).  For analysis, see David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, The Problems with Punitive 
Damages in Lawsuits against Managed-Care Organizations, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 280 (2000); 
Clark C. Havighurst, Consumers Versus Managed Care: The New Class Actions, HEALTH AFF., 
July-Aug. 2001, at 8; Kathy L. Cerminara, Taking a Closer Look at the Managed Care Class 
Actions: Impact Litigation as an Assist to the Market, 11 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1 (2002). 
 14. We are reminded of the following words from Peter Hammer: 
Within this patchwork system, it is nearly impossible to answer legal questions 
concerning managed care liability with any level of generality, other than “it depends.”  
Liability depends upon the structure of the managed care organization, an economic entity 
that is constantly evolving and taking different shapes.  Liability depends upon which 
state the plan is in, and the extent to which that state’s tort law has evolved to address 
changing institutional forms in health care.  Liability depends upon whether the plan is in 
an ERISA-qualified plan, and potentially on whether that plan is self-funded.  Liability 
also depends upon the prevailing judicial attitudes toward ERISA preemption. 
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on the overall level of liability exposure that have been expressed in our 
interviews with lawyers and health plan managers.  Views differed most 
sharply according to whether the subjects presented a national or more local 
perspective.  Most subjects who were focused on one of our particular study 
states (Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, New Jersey, Texas and Virginia), such as 
lawyers with local HMOs or Blue Cross plans, felt that the liability threat was 
low or only moderate.  The local health plans noted that a variety of theories of 
liability might exist in their states and that HMOs or other MCOs had been 
sued.  Nonetheless, these plans had not experienced any large verdicts or 
prominent appellate court decisions, nor were a rash of lawsuits being filed 
locally.  In the words of one health plan executive, liability is more of a 
“theoretical concern” or general “cloud,” created by the sense that “anyone can 
sue over anything,” rather than a specific threat that was driving health plan 
decision-making.  Many local health plan lawyers could think of only one or 
two suits, and sometimes none, having been filed against their company, and 
these were typically dismissed or settled for small amounts.  Therefore, 
liability concerns remained largely speculative or “theoretical” in the minds of 
most subjects with a focus on a particular state.  For reasons noted below, this 
result was true both in states with and without a statute specifically creating 
liability.  Even in New Jersey, the one state in this study with the strongest 
liability precedents, interview subjects commented that the liability threat was 
not strong and was largely theoretical, since only a modest number of suits had 
been filed, and only a handful had been successful. 
Quite a different perspective came from subjects who have a more national 
perspective.15  Although some agreed with the assessment of a low liability 
exposure, most thought liability exposure was strong or substantial.  In the 
words of one defense lawyer, the “sharks are in the water” and are “sniffing 
blood.”  Another observer felt that the “real impact” of liability would be felt 
in a few more years, since very large verdicts are just starting to appear.  
Others said that “lawsuits are coming at us from places they haven’t come 
before,” that the liability threat is “real, not imagined,” that there is enough 
potential for liability “to get into trouble,” and that, although there was little 
real concern five years ago, there is “more panic” now due to the erosion of 
ERISA preemption and the other factors noted below.  Other subjects said that 
litigation is “fueled by” the “constant drumbeat” of negative press generated by 
media and patient advocacy groups, which create the perception that managed 
care companies are “cruel and heartless.” 
 
Peter J. Hammer, Pegram v. Herdrich: On Peritonitis, Preemption, and the Elusive Goal of 
Managed Care Accountability, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 767, 768 n.2 (2001). 
 15. Due to the study design, the national perspective reported here reflects primarily the 
viewpoints of health plans.  However, these viewpoints appear genuine and well grounded for the 
reasons noted in the text. 
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When asked to identify the primary drivers of liability, subjects pointed to 
a variety of sources.  Prominent in the minds of many were the large class 
action suits noted above.  Also mentioned frequently were the very large 
punitive damage verdicts, approaching $100 million, which have been issued 
by juries in a few cases.16  Health plan lawyers described these verdicts as 
“bolts of lightening” “out of the blue” that create a “lottery mentality” among 
plaintiffs’ lawyers.  Therefore, health plans have much greater difficulty 
treating these cases as simply a cost of doing business against which they can 
insure.  Instead, they believe that liability of this magnitude threatens the 
economic viability of managed care as an enterprise.  As one health plan 
representative explained, even if “the sky has not fallen yet,” it “only takes one 
big case to put you out of business.” 
Other interview subjects attributed the liability threat to more traditional 
types of suits.  One health plan lawyer commented that the class action 
lawsuits and big punitive damage cases produce most of the worry, but most of 
the work is focused on the everyday claims.  One defense lawyer said that no 
one thing accounts for the liability threat, rather “it’s everything,” as managed 
care organizations confront multiple different theories of liability.  Several 
health plan lawyers said that although the number of lawsuits is not increasing, 
their “severity” (the average cost of resolving them) is increasing substantially 
(up 33% in one year at one large insurer) due to the complexities of litigating 
ERISA preemption and the need to avoid risking huge punitive damage 
verdicts. 
 
 16. For example, in Fox v. Health Net, a California jury awarded $77 million in punitive 
damages (in addition to the more than $12 million in compensatory damages) against an HMO 
that had refused to pay for an innovative cancer treatment, which Ms. Fox’s surviving family 
members claimed resulted in her death.  Fox v. Health Net, No. 219692, 1993 WL 794305, at *1-
2 (Ca. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 1993).  This award was eclipsed by the $120 million dollar verdict in 
Goodrich v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare of Cal., Inc., No. rcv 20499 1999 WL 181418, at *4 (Cal. 
App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 1999).  Like Fox, the Goodrich verdict was based on an HMO’s 
refusal to authorize payment for an expensive, state-of-the-art treatment for terminal cancer that it 
considered to be experimental.  See id.; see also Michael J. Bidart & Ricardo Echeverria, 
Litigating an HMO Bad Faith Case From the Plaintiff’s Perspective and the Lessons of Goodrich 
v. Aetna, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 427, 445 (2000) (total damages in Goodrich amounting to 
$120,564,363.40, $116,026,104,104.00 of which were punitive).  Similarly, an Ohio jury awarded 
$51 million against a Blue Cross plan for failing to pay for cancer treatment.  Dardinger v. 
Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, No. 99-CA-127 2001 WL 575129, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 
22, 2001), aff’d, 2002 Ohio 7113, 2002 Ohio LEXIS 3081, at *54-55 (Ohio December 20, 2002) 
(noting that “Anthem had worn [plaintiffs] down as surely as the cancer had” and that “the level 
of reprehensibility [of defendants’ conduct] sufficient to warrant the substantial punitive damages 
award the jury imposed”).  A Florida jury awarded nearly $80 million against Humana for 
terminating coverage for a special therapy program for a child with cerebral palsy, although the 
verdict was subsequently set aside for improper jury instructions and evidentiary errors.  Humana 
Health Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Chipps, 802 So. 2d 492, 495 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001). 
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These conflicting views can be explained, at least in part, by a survey of 
the several different bodies of law that affect the liability exposure of managed 
care organizations.  The next section compares the law “on the books” with the 
“law in action.” 
B. State law claims of direct corporate and vicarious liability 
1. The Law “On the Books” 
States have systematically expanded the theories upon which managed care 
organizations can be held liable to injured enrollees when they have not been 
prohibited from doing so by federal preemption of state laws.  State courts 
have looked to hospital liability cases decided in medicine’s pre-managed-care 
era to develop the doctrinal bases for managed care liability.17  Health 
maintenance organizations that directly provide care to enrollees present the 
closest analogy to hospitals, and, therefore, the clearest case for imposing 
liability under direct negligence theories developed in the hospital context.  In 
Shannon v. McNulty,18 a Pennsylvania court reasoned, “[w]e see no reason 
why the duties applicable to hospitals should not be equally applied to an 
HMO when that HMO is performing the same or similar functions as a 
hospital.”19  Those duties included a duty to select and retain competent 
caregivers, to oversee the care they provide, and to establish and adhere to 
policies to ensure quality care.20 
Few managed care organizations employ licensed individuals to provide 
health care services to their enrollees, and fewer still operate inpatient 
facilities.  Most simply arrange for the provision of services by contracting 
with independent caregivers and institutions.  Moreover, managed care 
organizations do not have physical custody of their enrollees as hospitals do of 
 
 17. The legal doctrine of institutional, or direct corporate, negligence in health care can be 
traced to the 1965 opinion in Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 211 N.E.2d 
253 (Ill. 1965).  The court there held that a hospital could be held directly liable for “[f]ail[ing] to 
have “a sufficient number of trained nurses for bedside care of all patients at all times,” to bring 
patients’ complications to the attention of hospital administration or the medical staff, to require 
specialty consultation, and to oversee the treatment provided to patients in the hospital.  Id. at 
258.  The court based its holding on its finding that hospitals did “more than furnish facilities for 
treatment.”  Id. at 257.  Patients looked to hospitals for treatment, and hospitals obliged, charging 
and collecting for treatment provided by nurses, physicians, administrative, and other staff 
employed on a salaried basis by the hospital.  Id. at 257 (citing Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 
(N.Y. 1957)). 
 18. 718 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).  The court held that an HMO that employed nurses 
to provide a telephone service for emergencies could be directly liable for failing to oversee them 
and for failing to adopt and enforce policies to ensure the quality of information provided to 
enrollees.  Id. at 835-36. 
 19. Id. at 836. 
 20. Id. at 831 (citing Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 707 (Pa. 1991)). 
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their patients.  Nonetheless, state courts barely paused in extending notions of 
institutional liability to those managed care organizations as well.21  As the 
Darling court relied on the expanding role of the hospital in the health care 
delivery system of the 1960s to formulate the theory of direct institutional 
liability, courts have relied on the central role of managed care organizations in 
the modern-day medical landscape to expand theories of direct corporate 
responsibility and liability to managed care organizations that merely arrange, 
but do not provide, medical services.  Courts have reasoned, “HMOs undertake 
an expansive role in arranging for and providing health care services,”22 and 
“healthcare is channeled through HMOs with the subscribers being given little 
or no say in the stewardship of their care.”23  In distinguishing more limited 
types of health care organizations not subject to institutional liability from 
managed care organizations, courts have pointed to the “central role in the total 
health care” of enrollees that is played by managed care organizations.24  They 
have analogized the legal constraint on patient choice that is embedded in 
managed care benefit designs, to the practical constraint on patient choice that 
arises from inpatient confinement.25  The corporate negligence doctrine as 
applied to a managed care organization, then, is not based primarily on its role 
in direct provision of health care services—the central factor in applying the 
doctrine to hospitals—but rather on its contractual commitment to arrange or 
provide comprehensive health care services and the constraints imposed on 
enrollee choice.26  The laudable purpose of controlling health care spending, it 
seems has not protected managed care organizations from state law liability 
anymore than the critical nature of hospitals to medical care delivery shielded 
the hospital. 
 
 21. Cf. Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc., 781 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1989) (en banc) (non-profit 
HMO not liable for negligent selection of surgeon based on state statute that exempted non-profit 
health services corporations from certain forms of liability); McClellan v. Health Maint. Org. of 
Pa., 604 A.2d 1053 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (HMO can be held liable for negligent selection and 
retention of physicians under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323, rather than by extension 
of doctrine of institutional negligence).  McClennan was later clarified in Shannon, 718 A.2d at 
836. 
 22. Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Ill., 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1128 (Ill. 2000) (HMO can be held 
liable if it negligently assigned more patients to a contract physician than he was capable of 
serving). 
 23. Shannon, 718 A.2d at 835. 
 24. Dowhouer v. Judson, 45 Pa. D. & C.4th 172, 181 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2000) (distinguishing 
physicians’ practice group from hospitals and HMOs in declining to extend corporate negligence 
doctrine); see Milan v. Am. Vision Ctr., 34 F. Supp. 2d 279 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (distinguishing an 
optometrist’s office from a hospital and an HMO to decline to extend corporate liability doctrine). 
 25. See Milan, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 282. 
 26. See Mennecke v. Saint Vincent Health Ctr., No. Civ. Ap. 98-50, 1998 WL 1753663, at 
*7 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2000).  The doctrine of corporate negligence extends to “organizations that 
provide ‘total health care’ if the individual is given no meaningful choice in their health care.”Id.   
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State courts have readily extended vicarious liability theories developed to 
hold hospitals legally accountable for the negligence of independent medical 
staff physicians to network-based managed care organizations and their 
contracted physicians.  Many courts have adopted the theory of apparent or 
ostensible agency to find an agency relationship between a managed care 
organization and an independent physician, exposing the managed care 
organization to vicarious liability for the physician’s negligence.27  Although 
the precise parameters of the apparent agency doctrine vary by state, a plaintiff 
typically must establish that the managed care organization held itself out as a 
provider of health care, and that she relied upon that conduct, looking to the 
managed care organization rather than to the individual physician to obtain 
health care services.28  Because most of the reported cases have arisen in 
appeals of summary judgment motions granted to the HMO, the factors that a 
trier of fact will consider persuasive evidence of agency cannot be determined 
with certainty.  In discussing whether an HMO has held itself out as a provider 
of care, courts have looked to marketing materials promising the “best care,”29 
member handbooks stating that the HMO will “provide ‘all your health care 
needs,’”30 and advertisements characterizing the HMO as a “total [health] care 
program which not only insures . . . but provides medical care, guarantees the 
quality of the care and controls the costs . . . .”31In contrast, a managed care 
organization characterizing itself as “a corporation formed to arrange for 
professional health services,” without more, was not found to hold itself out as 
a provider of health care services.32  After concluding that a managed care 
organization meets the apparent agency doctrinal requirement that it hold itself 
out as a provider of care, courts typically find that the restrictions imposed on 
enrollees in their choice of physicians and in their ability to access care satisfy 
the justifiable-reliance prong of the analysis.33  As one court stated, an 
 
 27. See, e.g., Decker v. Saini, No. 88-361768 NH, 1991 WL 277590, at *3-4 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 
Sept. 17, 1991); Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1235 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). 
 28. Compare Decker, 1991 WL 277590, at *2 (doctrine based on estoppel), with Boyd, 547 
A.2d at 1234 (doctrine based on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429). 
 29. Decker, 1991 WL 277590, at *4. 
 30.  Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., Inc., 719 N.E.2d 756, 762 (Ill. 1999). 
 31.  Boyd, 547 A.2d at 1232 n.6. 
 32. Chase v. Indep. Practice Ass’n, Inc., 583 N.E.2d 251, 255 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991). 
 33. Reliance has been proved by evidence that the enrollee paid a membership fee to the 
managed care organization, rather than fees for services to caregivers.  Justifiable reliance has 
also been based on a finding that an enrollee selected a primary care physician from a list 
provided by the managed care organization.  Other factors include that the enrollee must receive a 
referral to see a specialist to obtain reimbursement and that the primary care physician, not the 
enrollee, selects the specialist from a list provided by the managed care organization.  See Boyd, 
547 A.2d at 1234-35; Decker, 1991 WL 277590, at *4.  A finding of reliance might be defeated, 
however, if the enrollee had a relationship with the negligent physician that predated her 
enrollment in the defendant-managed care organization.  See Lewis v. Cent. Okla. Med. Group, 
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enrollee’s “reliance [upon the HMO] is shown not only to be compelling, but 
literally compelled” by the HMO’s  “method of operation.”34 
States have also expanded the common law bases for holding managed 
care organizations liable for the acts of the independent physicians with whom 
they contract.  At least one court has held that a managed care organization can 
be held vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the 
medical malpractice of an independent physician if the managed care 
organization had implied authority to exercise sufficient control over the 
physician to negate an independent contractor status.35 In Petrovich v. Share 
Health Plan, the Illinois court found implied authority to control independent 
physicians on the basis of common managed care practices, including 
reimbursing physicians through capitation payments, conducting quality 
assurance review of physicians’ medical records, requiring patients to select 
primary care physician gatekeepers and mandating approval of referrals to 
specialists as a condition of payment for services.36 
Managed care organizations have seen their affirmative defenses to 
medical malpractice claims erode.  For example, in early cases, managed care 
organizations argued that they could not be liable for medical malpractice 
because the so-called corporate practice of medicine doctrine prohibited them 
from practicing medicine.37  Later cases undercut this argument.  In Sloan v. 
Metropolitan Health Council of Indianapolis, Inc.,38 for example, an Indiana 
court of appeals analogized the argument that a managed care organization 
cannot be liable for the acts of physicians because it cannot be licensed to 
medicine, to one that a city cannot be liable for the negligence of an agent 
driving a car because the city cannot obtain a driver’s license.  In other states, 
legislatures have enacted statutes that preclude managed care organizations 
from using the corporate practice of medicine doctrine to defend against claims 
 
998 P.2d 202, 205 (1999) (noting that the plaintiffs had not been treated by the defendant-
physicians prior to their enrollment in the defendant-managed care organization). 
 34. Petrovich, 719 N.E.2d at 769. 
 35. See id. at 764.  “Implied authority” was defined as actual right to control proved by 
circumstantial evidence.  Id. at 770.  But see Chase, 583 N.E.2d at 254 (cost-containment and 
utilization-review measures do not establish right to control when the responsibility for actual 
provision of medical treatment rests with the physician). 
 36. Petrovich, 719 N.E.2d at 774-75. 
 37. The corporate practice of medicine doctrine holds that only natural persons who hold 
medical licenses can lawfully practice medicine.  Under this doctrine, a corporate entity that 
employs physicians to provide medical services is engaged in the unlawful practice of medicine.  
The doctrine is subject to many exceptions, for example, for non-profit hospitals, and has been 
widely criticized.  For a discussion of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, see Adam M. 
Freiman, Comment, The Abandonment of the Antiquated Corporate Practice of Medicine 
Doctrine: Injecting a Dose of Efficiency into the Modern Health Care Environment, 47 EMORY 
L.J. 697 (1998). 
 38. 516 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). 
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involving medical malpractice.39  Perhaps a Michigan circuit court offered the 
best, or at least the most candid, explanation for the state courts’ willingness to 
expand or create new theories of liability to hold managed care organizations 
legally accountable, acknowledging that imposing liability on HMOs is a 
“matter of public policy” intended to “strongly encourage them to select 
physicians with the best credentials,” and to counter any tendency to “be 
driven by economics to retain physicians with the least desirable credentials, 
for the lowest prices.”40 
2. The “Law in Action” 
Considering the variety of legal theories under which health plans might be 
held vicariously liable as a matter of course, and that ERISA does not preempt 
vicarious theories, we expected to hear in our interviews with lawyers and 
health plan managers that vicarious liability was a major concern.  That 
expectation proved accurate for staff model HMOs, and to a lesser extent for 
HMOs organized by hospitals or physicians, but not for the other models of 
managed care organizations that dominate the market. 
Staff model HMOs we interviewed considered themselves clearly 
responsible for their physicians’ negligence.  For instance, one lawyer with a 
staff model HMO that focuses on the Medicaid population said that vicarious 
liability for “bad baby” cases is a major cost and concern for the company.  
However, there are relatively few staff model HMOs in most insurance 
markets.  More common, but still in the minority, are HMOs organized by and 
affiliated with hospitals and/or large physician groups.  Although these group 
model HMOs craft their legal relationship with providers as independent 
contractors rather than employees, some report being named in vicarious 
liability suits more frequently than HMOs that have no visible institutional 
affiliation with their contracted providers.  Other provider-based plans, 
however, said that vicarious suits are rare, opining that it is easier for lawyers 
to simply sue the hospital or the university that owns the health plan, rather 
than the health plan itself.  They noted the hospital or university would be sued 
in any event, even if no health plan were involved. 
The most common form of managed care network structure is a contractual 
affiliation with many or most providers in the market, the so-called mixed 
independent practice association, or IPA, model.  Regarding these 
arrangements, some defense lawyers said an “extreme sense” of the ostensible 
agency doctrine is “spreading” in which agency is determined solely by 
 
 39. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-3153 (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 54-1-48 (2000). 
 40. Decker v. Saini, No. 88-361768 NH, 1991 WL 277590, at *4 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept. 17, 
1991).  See Petrovich, 719 N.E.2d at 764 (“HMO accountability is essential to counterbalance the 
HMO goal of cost-containment” and “the inherent drive to achieve a large and ever-increasing 
profit margin”). 
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“what’s in the member’s head,” if a patient “had some reason to think that the 
doc was your agent, that’s it.”  Even if there is not a strong legal case for 
vicarious liability, one health plan lawyer said that naming the insurer in a 
medical malpractice causes its own liability insurer to increase the pressure to 
settle, which leads the insurer to pay even when it feels that it did not do 
anything wrong. 
However, this is a minority view.  The prevailing view among both 
defense and plaintiffs’ lawyers is that, in most states, the simple existence of a 
network and of gatekeeping features is not enough to create vicarious liability.  
Rulings in most states, especially trial court rulings, have been much less 
receptive to the more sweeping claims of vicarious responsibility for the 
quality of care discussed above.  One observer explained that HMOs may fear 
courts will always find vicarious liability, but this is “just paranoia.”  One large 
health plan initially thought that vicarious liability would become significant 
enough that going into the medical malpractice insurance business might make 
sense, but stated that it had since changed its mind, in part, because it was so 
rarely sued along with its physicians.  Even one prominent plaintiffs’ lawyer 
thought that holding health plans responsible for the medical mistakes of “tens 
of thousands of physicians” would impose “too much burden” on them. 
According to the more restricted view, vicarious liability does not exist 
unless the physician is an actual agent of the health plan, or the health plan 
intervened in some way to influence the physician’s decision.  Defense lawyers 
noted that vicarious liability claims usually involve allegations that the health 
plan influenced the physicians’ treatment decisions (or non-decisions) in some 
way, for instance, through the use of financial incentives or utilization 
guidelines, rather than the more general structural claim that MCOs are 
automatically responsible for physicians’ negligence based on the existence of 
a contracted network.  Both plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers explained that most 
potential cases do not involve these kinds of special facts, since most medical 
mistakes do not involve explicit clinical decisions about whether or not to treat, 
which might be based on resource considerations; instead, typically they are 
ordinary acts of carelessness or oversight. 
Most health plans we interviewed attempt to minimize their exposure to 
vicarious liability by disavowing agency in member materials and on 
membership cards.  These disclaimers state that physicians are independent 
contractors not subject to the control of the managed care organization.  They 
also attempt to clarify that providers are solely responsible for treatment 
decisions, and that the health plan makes decisions only about coverage and 
payment.  Health plans regard “educating” patients in this fashion as one of 
their primary risk management strategies.  We were told, and we observed, that 
the treatment/payment or plan/provider distinction is “all over” health plan 
materials, including on web sites and even on the member identification cards 
of at least one prominent health plan.  The effort to maintain this distinction 
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has also led HMOs to stop displaying their names in the offices of physicians 
and hospitals.  One lawyer noted, “The marketing imperative led them to do 
things like that.  Now the liability imperative is getting them to stop.  The 
MCOs finally figured that out.”  Health plan lawyers consider these 
disclaimers or statements about legal relationships and respective 
responsibilities reasonably effective in court.41  One lawyer with a provider-
based health plan said that, after the health plan defeated a couple of vicarious 
liability suits on the strength of this language, the plaintiffs’ lawyer who had 
brought several more of these suits dismissed the remainder of them; no more 
have been filed. 
A final factor mitigating health plans’ liability exposure for medical 
negligence is the added complexity and cost created by naming a large insurer 
as a defendant in what otherwise is a garden-variety medical malpractice case.  
Contrary to the common perception that plaintiffs’ lawyers are eager to add 
more deep pocket defendants to their lawsuits, almost all of the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers we interviewed said they are very reluctant to sue health plans unless 
the right set of facts presents itself.  Because plaintiffs’ lawyers work on a 
contingency fee basis, they have to fund the costs of litigation out-of-pocket.  
These expenses are usually several tens of thousands of dollars, even in 
ordinary medical malpractice cases.  Adding an entirely different theory of 
liability and a large institutional defendant with “infinite resources” to defend 
itself greatly magnifies the anticipated cost and length of litigation, as does the 
introduction of ERISA preemption issues.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers explained that 
taking on these additional challenges is unnecessary if the facts point to other 
well-insured defendants such as the physician or hospital as the potential 
wrongdoer.  In the words of one lawyer, “What do I need with another set of 
lawyers when I already have the [providers] on the hook?” He explained that, 
so far, he has always been able to achieve his main goal, which is to 
“economically rehabilitate his client,” without “taking on an 800 pound 
gorilla.”  “You have to be ready to go the full distance” if you sue an insurer.  
Another lawyer said that he likes to “use a rifle rather than a shotgun,” 
meaning that he needs a “very good reason” to add another defendant that will 
bring in another set of lawyers, experts and depositions, and another said “if 
you have a great medical malpractice case, why would you want to screw it up 
 
 41. See, e.g., Jones v. U.S. Healthcare, 723 N.Y.S.2d 478, 478 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)  
(HMO “cannot be held vicariously liable . . ., where the documentary evidence, including, in 
particular, plaintiff’s Group Master Contract, membership card and Member Handbook, clearly 
states that doctors and hospitals . . . are independent contractors” (citation omitted)).  The 
disclosure might have to be prominent and consistent; a “single disclaimer of an agency 
relationship  . . . within a ‘whole stack’ of information” might not be determinative if other 
evidence supports an agency relationship.  Petrovich, 719 N.E.2d at 767. 
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by bringing in an HMO.”42  Defense lawyers agreed that suits against health 
plans are “one of the most complex you’ll ever encounter.” 
Because Texas has generated the most litigation experience against health 
plans under its managed care liability statute, Texas lawyers were especially 
articulate about the variety of complexities in these cases.  First, because 
vicarious liability requires showing some degree of influence or control, 
having two sets of experts is advisable, one concerning the quality of medical 
care and the extent of injury, and a second concerning how managed care 
organizations function and how decisions were made in this particular case.  
Second, a suit against a health plan requires a showing that it did something to 
alter the course of care, which creates an additional causation issue that must 
be proved.  Doing so is difficult, since, in the words of one defense lawyer, “it 
is going to be a freak situation where a doctor comes forward and says he 
altered his treatment based on what the insurance will pay for.”  Texas lawyers 
also noted that suing multiple parties under newer theories of liability makes 
cases harder to settle and more likely to result in an appeal if they succeed at 
trial.  Also, the absence of state appellate decisions under the Texas liability 
statute creates tremendous uncertainties about how jury instructions should be 
framed, which creates a much higher risk of reversal on appeal.  According to 
one experienced Texas lawyer, “the simple truth of the matter is that no one is 
going to invest a small fortune in a case whose outcome is uncertain.” 
Lawyers in several states explained that the major advantage to naming a 
managed care organization as a defendant is the possibility of obtaining very 
large punitive damages or higher compensatory damages by introducing 
economic issues in order to “poison the well.”  This advantage is minimized, 
however, in states with caps on damages that apply to health insurers.  In 
addition, the prospect of punitive damages is more promising when the health 
plan appears to be the primary wrongdoer than it is in a lawsuit aimed 
primarily against the physician in which the health plan’s liability is based 
solely on a vicarious theory. 
Consistent with this reported litigation experience, we found very little 
evidence in our interviews that health plans are motivated by the threat of 
liability to improve the quality of medical care delivered by their providers.  
Instead, the strong market-driven trend among most managed care plans is to 
contract with as many providers of acceptable quality as possible, screening 
out only those few with very bad credentials, and leaving patients to decide 
which providers offer the best quality of care.  Health plans do engage 
 
 42. One instance where a plaintiffs’ lawyer said it makes good sense to name the HMO is if 
it is clearly vicariously liable due to an employment relationship where the HMO pays for 
liability coverage.  Then, the ability to deal with an institutional defendant and drop the individual 
physician facilitates settlement by avoiding the need to report the physician to the National 
Practitioner Data Bank. 
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regularly in checking the credentials of physicians in their networks, much as 
hospitals do for their medical staff members.  However, we consistently heard 
in our interviews that regulatory and private accreditation requirements, rather 
than attempts to reduce liability, direct credentialing efforts.  Some subjects 
commented that liability makes re-credentialing more rigorous than it would be 
otherwise, or that liability concerns can cause a health plan to refuse a 
physician whose credentials are “on the bubble.”  Several subjects noted that, 
in their experience, virtually the only time that health plans terminate a 
physician’s contract before it expires is over concerns about malpractice 
history or failure to carry sufficient malpractice insurance.  The vast majority 
of interviewees, however, said that credentialing is simply done “by the book,” 
and often delegated outright to medical groups, without any searching inquiry 
motivated by serious concerns over potential health plan liability.  As one 
defense lawyer explained: “[t]he fact of the matter is that you can’t credential 
to a sufficient level of detail to defend yourself when you’ve got a doc who 
does something bad.”  Therefore, managed care organizations do not view 
credentialing as primarily a risk management function.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers had 
consistent views, explaining that credentialing suits are very hard to win, even 
against hospitals, so they are not inclined to try this largely untested theory 
against health plans.  Defense lawyers agreed that, whereas credentialing 
liability exists in theory, they could think of only a very few or no such suits 
actually having been filed. 
C. Claims of managed-care organization wrongdoing. 
Managed care liability exposure is potentially much greater under theories 
of direct liability that point to the health plan as the primary wrongdoer.43  
Managed care organizations engage in a variety of practices to control health 
care spending and to create incentives intended to cause physicians to take cost 
effective approaches to medical care.44  A managed care organization might 
 
 43. For purposes of this Article, the distinction between vicarious liability and direct liability 
turns on whether the treating physician or the health plan was the decision-maker who was 
responsible for making or influencing the medical decision at issue. Therefore, we group 
negligent credentialing claims with pure vicarious liability claims. Even though a negligent 
credentialing claim is typically treated as a claim of institutional negligence and therefore viewed 
as a form of direct liability, negligent credentialing claims still assume that the treating physician 
made a medical mistake.  Such claims seek to hold the health plan secondarily liable, on the 
theory that the health plan wrongfully included the negligent physician in its network, thereby 
failing to protect the patient from harm.  The version of direct liability we are focused on here is 
one that claims the managed care organization caused the complained of harm as a result of a cost 
containment initiative. 
 44. In Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000), the Court classified “pure eligibility 
decisions” as those determining whether a certain type of illness or treatment is covered under the 
terms of the coverage documents.  Id. at 228.  Such decisions can be made within the four corners 
of the contract, and do not involve consideration of individual medical factors or circumstances.  
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require pre-certification of proposed treatment as a condition of payment, 
restrict coverage to services it deems “medically necessary”, or use 
reimbursement strategies intended to shift the financial risk of patient care to 
their caregivers.45  Population-based data tend to show that, with the possible 
exception of certain vulnerable populations, care provided in a managed care 
system subject to such practices is of comparable quality with care provided in 
a fee-for-service system.46  Inevitably, however, managed care practices or 
incentives will cause or contribute to harm in some individual cases. 
In such circumstances, individuals who are not ERISA plan beneficiaries 
have been free to seek legal redress against the managed care organization.  
For example, in Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Illinois, the court held that an 
HMO could be liable to a Medicaid recipient, who received services through a 
managed Medicaid plan, for institutional negligence if it had assigned more 
patients to a contract physician than he was capable of serving.47  ERISA plan 
beneficiaries, however, have been barred from seeking legal redress under state 
law.48  Thus, managed care organizations have enjoyed a shield from liability 
for challenges to cost containment initiatives, at least as to claims by those 137 
million Americans who are ERISA plan beneficiaries.49  This section reports 
how effective this liability shield is perceived to be by lawyers and managers 
in the field, and then explores recent trends in the case law that are influencing 
legal perceptions and strategies. 
 
Such benefit determinations should be viewed as contract disputes to be resolved under the 
common law of contract, which is modified somewhat in the ERISA context.  See, e.g., Jordan v. 
Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 900 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1990) (court must determine when the plan 
administration has given the plan documents a uniform construction that is consistent with a fair 
reading of the plan).  Benefit determinations that do not involve clinical decisions are beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
 45. For a more complete discussion of these practices, see Gail B. Agrawal, Resuscitating 
Professionalism: Self Regulation in the Medical Marketplace, 66 MO. L. REV. 341, 351-59 
(2001). 
 46. Joseph Gottfried & Frank A. Sloan, The Quality of Managed Care: Evidence from the 
Medical Literature, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Fall 2002, at 103; Robert H. Miller & Harold S. 
Luft, HMO Plan Performance Update: An Analysis of The Literature, HEALTH AFF., July 2002, 
at 63; James D. Reschovsky & Peter Kemper, Do HMOs Make a Difference?, 36 INQUIRY 374 
(1999). 
 47. 730 N.E.2d 1119 (Ill. 2000). 
 48. See, e.g., Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, 844 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (plaintiff’s 
attempt to hold HMO liable under state common law theories preempted). 
 49. The United States Census Bureau estimates that eighty percent of the 172 million 
Americans insured through employer health benefit plans are covered by private sector secular 
employer plans subject to ERISA.  See Labor Force, Employment and Earnings 2001 at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/01statab/labor.pdf (last visited August 2, 2002). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] WHAT IF YOU COULD SUE YOUR HMO? 251 
1. ERISA Preemption in Practice 
Health plan lawyers and managers view ERISA preemption as a major 
determinant of liability exposure for health plans’ coverage decisions.  For 
instance, lawyers and business managers consider the liability threat to be 
much greater with state and local government employees, who are not covered 
by ERISA, than with ERISA plan beneficiaries.50  Thus, experienced lawyers 
have little or no doubt that state law would, under one theory or another, 
impose liability for wrongful denial of covered benefits or interference with 
good medical practice.51  ERISA, however, introduces major uncertainties. 
A number of plaintiffs lawyers said in interviews that the complications 
and uncertainties created by “the ERISA monster” made them more reluctant 
to take on suits against HMOs when there were other available defendants, 
such as the treating physician, who can be sued without involving complex 
issues of federal law or having the case removed from state to federal court.  
Most plaintiffs’ lawyers we spoke to said that, with the “right set of facts” 
where there is serious injury and the health plan rather than the provider is 
clearly implicated, they would be willing to challenge conventional thinking or 
existing precedents.  In the more typical case, however, plaintiffs’ lawyers said 
that, if they could avoid ERISA issues, they would.  One plaintiffs lawyer 
declared that, “if it’s an employee benefit, you’re out of luck right away.”  
Another explained that he is “a lot more scared to spend the firm’s money” 
when the law is unsettled, since “the legal landscape is littered with firms that 
have invested in [expensive] cases they shouldn’t have,” which can bring down 
the entire firm.  Accordingly, most of the plaintiffs’ lawyers we interviewed 
have almost always focused their lawsuits for medical injury on conventional 
defendants. 
Defense lawyers acknowledged that ERISA preemption has deterred 
plaintiffs from filing as many suits against health plans as they might have.  In 
the words of one defense lawyer, there has been a “learning curve” in which 
the plaintiffs’ bar has “caught on” to the fact that ERISA issues make these 
cases much more complicated than ordinary tort suits.  Defense lawyers also 
noted that it is much easier to establish preemption for theories of direct 
liability than for vicarious liability.  Two defense lawyers said that, when a 
case involves an ERISA plan and they think their position is correct on the 
merits, they are more willing to go to court to attempt having it dismissed on 
preemption grounds rather than agreeing to settle it out of court for a 
 
 50. This increased liability exposure for government workers causes one large health plan 
we interviewed to avoid selling to state and local government employee plans altogether.  
However, other plans said they simply add the cost of this liability exposure into their rates or 
bids for this business. 
 51. This is not to say, however, that the particular theory of liability is irrelevant, since this 
might affect the standard of care or the availability of punitive damages. 
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substantial amount.  One experienced plaintiffs’ lawyer explained that less 
experienced lawyers often make the mistake of pleading too many different 
theories of liability, some of which are clearly preempted. 
However, ERISA preemption is far from absolute.  There was widespread 
agreement in our interviews that ERISA preemption is “eroding” or being 
“diluted” “month by month” by various appellate court decisions that have 
“chipped away at the veneer” of the idea that “you can’t sue your HMO.”  One 
defense lawyer said, “nobody can be sure what court is going to rule which 
way” on preemption or whether a lawyer “can find a creative way to keep it in 
state court.”  One health plan lawyer said that he assumed that, for “something 
egregious,” the health plan would have to be able to defend itself on the merits 
in court.  There may be various defenses, the defense lawyers noted, such as 
ERISA preemption, but none of these are viewed as “airtight.” 
Several defense lawyers said that “smart plaintiffs’ lawyers” are learning 
how to plead their cases to “get around ERISA,” by framing almost any 
scenario as a quality of care issue rather than a covered benefits issue.  
Plaintiffs’ lawyers in some states agreed that ERISA is not a bar to suing as 
long as you can avoid “pleading into the teeth of ERISA” by taking the “square 
peg of a benefits denial case and fitting it into the round hold of a direct 
liability theory.”  Two very experienced lawyers said the only kinds of cases 
they would decline to take based on ERISA preemption are denials of coverage 
based on explicitly excluded services, such as not covering any organ 
transplants.  However, ERISA does not bar them from taking cases that 
involve coverage denials that are based in part on medical criteria, such as 
whether care is medically necessary, experimental, cosmetic, or custodial, and 
they are taking cases now that they would have turned down five years ago 
based on ERISA preemption.52 
One experienced defense lawyer noted that ERISA preemption is 
especially weak in state courts, where judges have been more reluctant to 
engage with ERISA’s obscure distinctions, instead preferring to send these 
cases to the jury.  This lawyer explained: 
When the case focuses on medical records and [when] two physicians, the 
attending physician and the medical director, are looking at the same medical 
records and disagreeing about the necessity or appropriateness of treatment, 
convincing a state court judge that one is making a treatment decision and the 
other is making only a coverage determination is a complex sell. 
A health plan lawyer agreed, explaining that state courts “pay attention to 
what they know, and they don’t know about ERISA, they don’t understand it, 
 
 52. Two lawyers were even prepared to take cases based on denial of prescriptions drugs 
specifically excluded from formularies, since health plans have discretion over what to include in 
formularies, and physicians can request exceptions to formularies when justified by medical 
criteria. 
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and they could care less about” federal preemption.  This lawyer also noted 
that remand orders are not appealable, so even if he feels like he has a good 
ERISA defense, it doesn’t do any good “as a practical matter” if the case is not 
in federal court.  In state court, the defense might work at the appellate level, 
but the lawyer needs to get to the appellate level to have any argument, which 
means the lawyer first has to lose at the trial court, which no lawyer wants to 
risk.  Therefore, several lawyers noted that, in most cases, the ERISA defense 
is fought and resolved at the level of removal and remand, rather than 
providing a basis for dismissal by trial courts. 
2. ERISA Preemption on the Horizon 
The first prominent crack in the ERISA preemption shield was created by 
the Third Circuit’s decision in Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare.53  Confronting a 
particularly tragic set of facts in one of two companion cases,54 the Third 
Circuit distinguished claims challenging the quality of services provided from 
claims challenging the quantity of services.  The former survived preemption; 
the latter did not.55  Although this distinction might have been interpreted as 
simply stating a shorthand rule-of-thumb for vicarious versus direct theories of 
liability, subsequent decisions have stretched the quantity/quality distinction, 
some would say beyond recognition, to allow suits to proceed that challenge 
core managed care practices such as prior authorization or gatekeeping.56 
 
 53. 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1009 (1995).  For a complete 
discussion of this case and the quality-quantity distinction, see James F. Henry, Liability of 
Managed Care Organizations After Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare: An Elemental Analysis, 27 CUMB. 
L. REV. 681 (1996). 
 54. The companion case, Visconti v. U.S. Healthcare, 857 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Pa. 1994), 
involved a deceased infant and an obstetrician who was suffering from severe substance abuse 
and mental health problems.  The physician later surrendered his license to practice medicine.  
The plaintiffs claimed that U.S. Healthcare was negligent in allowing the physician to remain in 
the network.  For a discussion of the facts underlying the Viscontis’ claim against the HMO, see 
Darryl Van Duch, New Danger for HMOs, NAT’L L.J., May 13, 1996, at A-1 (describing the 
physician as a “physical and psychological wreck” who had a “history of alcohol and drug abuse 
with memory lapses” and who was “preoccupied at the time of treatment with deciding whether 
to have a sex change operation”). 
 55. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 358. 
 56. For instance, no preemption was found in a case where the HMO sent a mother and 
newborn baby patient home after only twenty-four hours (a so-called “drive-through delivery”).  
The HMO and the doctor failed to order sufficient follow-up care when the mother called in to 
report that the baby was sick, the baby died, and the parents sued.  In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 
F.3d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 1999).  The court interpreted “quantity” narrowly to mean “a claim that a 
certain benefit was requested and denied.”  Id. at 163.  It interpreted quality-related issues to 
include anything relating to the provision and management of care, including decisions that care 
is not medically appropriate or necessary.  Id. at 162.  Here, the plaintiff alleged that the twenty-
four hour rule was negligent in its inception and interpretation, and, even with the rule, the HMO 
and the doctor should have given better follow-up care.  Id. at 156.  The plaintiffs also alleged 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
254 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:235 
The perception that ERISA preemption was being systematically chipped 
away began in earnest the following year, with the Supreme Court’s 1995 
decision in New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers Insurance Company,57 a case challenging a New York state 
surcharge on hospital rates to fund care for uninsured patients.  Writing for a 
unanimous Court, Justice David Souter observed that Congress did not 
“[choose] to displace general health care regulation, which historically has 
been a matter of local concern.”58  This comment, while clearly dicta, fueled 
speculation that ERISA might not preempt a state law aimed at protecting 
managed-care enrollees from poor quality care, given that the quality of care 
and qualifications of caregivers were the preeminent historical justifications for 
state regulation of the health care industry.59  Might the state’s authority extend 
to laws targeted to unsatisfactory patient outcomes that resulted from managed 
care practices?  We still have no definitive answer. 
The trend continued five years later in Pegram v. Herdrich.60  Justice 
Souter, again writing for a unanimous Court, stirred the ERISA preemption pot 
in a case that did not, in fact, present a preemption issue.  The Court’s holding 
was that ERISA itself is not violated when an HMO physician simultaneously 
makes a treatment and a coverage decision, 61 even though this might appear to 
be a conflict of interest that breaches fiduciary duties.  In the course of 
reaching its conclusion on the scope of ERISA fiduciary obligations, the Court, 
mused: “What would be the value to the plan participant of having this kind of 
ERISA fiduciary action?  It would simply apply the law already available in 
state courts and federal diversity actions today.”62  However, a state court 
remedy is “available” only if it is not subject to preemption by ERISA.63  
 
that the HMO pressured its doctors to compromise quality in order to save money.  Id.  See also 
Lazorko v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 237 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 2000) (allegation that HMO financial 
incentives caused physicians to withhold necessary care goes to quality rather than quantity of 
care). 
 57. 514 U.S. 645 (1995). 
 58. Id. at 680. 
 59. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889) (physician licensure with state board of 
medicine oversight).  See also LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, 
RESTRAINT 288-90 (2000) (noting “tort law can be an important tool for advancing the public’s 
health”). 
 60. 530 U.S. 211 (2000). 
 61. Such decisions were classified as “mixed eligibility and treatment decisions” and 
contrasted with “pure unmixed eligibility decisions”, which determined coverage under plan 
documents without reference to patient needs, and “treatment decisions,” which determine a 
course of treatment based on a patient’s conditions without regard to coverage.  Id. at 228. 
 62. Id. at 236. 
 63. See Miller v. HealthAmerica Pa., Inc., 50 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 26 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2000) 
(“the U.S. Supreme Court appears to acknowledge, that, in connection with certain claims against 
an HMO . . ., a state court remedy is ‘already available.’ Such a remedy is ‘available,’ in state 
court, of course, only if it is not subject to preemption by ERISA”). 
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Conventional wisdom had been that all state law challenges to ERISA plan 
benefit determinations were preempted, regardless of whether they were 
“mixed” or “pure” in their reliance on contractual coverage criteria or on 
individual clinical criteria.  In Pegram, the Court characterized its earlier 
opinion in New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers as one that “throws some cold water on the preemption theory,” and 
reiterated that the burden was high to establish preemption of subjects of 
“traditional state regulation.”64  Did the Court mean to suggest, contrary to 
widely held belief, that state law claims involving coverage decisions that were 
intertwined with any medical issue (now designated “mixed eligibility and 
treatment determinations”) are not preempted?65 
Federal and state courts continue to struggle with the answer to that 
question.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had the first opportunity to 
consider the ramifications of Pegram when the U.S. Supreme Court vacated 
and remanded its opinion in Pappas v. Asbel for reconsideration in light of 
Pegram.66  The court accepted this apparent invitation to expand the 
permissible scope of state law challenges to managed care practices.67  It 
reasoned that an HMO’s denial of permission to use a hospital outside of its 
network was a mixed eligibility and treatment decision under the 
categorization established in Pegram.68  The medical director, a physician 
employed by the HMO, “reviewed Pappas’ case, and rejected another medical 
doctor’s opinion based on his clinical judgment.”69  In doing so, the medical 
director “determined where and, under the circumstances, when” the patient’s 
medical condition would be treated.70  If he erred in this determination, the 
court held that the harm caused by that error could be redressed as medical 
 
 64. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 237. 
 65. See, e.g., Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Managed Care Liability for 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty After Pegram v. Herdrich: The End of ERISA Preemption for State Law 
Liability for Medical Care Decision Making, 53 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2001).  For general commentary 
on this case and its implications for ERISA preemption, see Symposium, Current Racial and 
Ethnic Disparities in Health, 1 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS (2001); Peter J. Hammer, 
On Peritonitis, Preemption, and the Elusive Goal of Managed Care Accountability, 26 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 767 (2001); Michael T. Cahill & Peter D. Jacobson, Pegram’s Regress: A 
Missed Chance For Sensible Judicial Review of Managed Care Decisions, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 
421(2001); Richard A. Ippolito, Freedom to Contract In Medical Care: HMOs, ERISA and 
Pegram v. Herdrich, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (2001); Arnold J. Rosoff, Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty Lawsuits Against MCOs, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 55 (2001); William M. Sage, UR Here: The 
Supreme Court’s Guide for Managed Care, HEALTH AFF. Sept.-Oct., 2002, at 219. 
 66. 530 U.S. 1241 (2000). 
 67. Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2001) (on remand for reconsideration in light of 
Pegram v. Herdrich), cert. denied sub. nom, U.S. Healthcare Systems of Pa., Inc. v. Pa. Hosp. 
Ins. Co., 122 S.Ct. 2618 (2002)). 
 68. Pappas, 768 A.2d at 1096. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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errors always are, under state medical malpractice law.71  The court purported 
to follow the combined instructions of Travelers that “ERISA does not 
preempt state law that regulates the provision of adequate medical treatment”, 
and Pegram that “an HMO’s mixed eligibility and treatment decision 
implicates a state law claim for medical malpractice.”72 
The task of applying ERISA to an era of managed care never envisioned 
by its framers is made more difficult by the lack of consistent signals from the 
Supreme Court.73  While the Pegram Court hinted that expanded state tort 
liability was possible, it also explicitly acknowledged the legitimacy of 
managed-care practices aimed at rationing care and cautioned that the judicial 
 
 71. Id.  Not all courts agree with this revolutionary reading of the Travelers-Pegram line of 
cases.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected it, stating without 
detailed analysis that “we do not read Pegram to entail that every conceivable state law claim 
survives preemption so long as it is based on a mixed question of eligibility and treatment.”  
Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep’t of Ins., 220 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 2000), vacated and 
remanded for reconsideration in light of Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 122 S.Ct. 2151 (2002), 
reinstated as modified, 314 F.3d 782 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that independent review provisions 
regulate the business of insurance and are not preempted as to insured ERISA plans, but declining 
to reconsider other aspects of its earlier opinion).  By way of limitation, the Fifth Circuit offered, 
“[I]t may be that state causes of action persist only for actions based in some part on malpractice 
committed by treating physicians.  If so, state causes of action against HMOs for the decisions of 
their utilization review agents would still be preempted.”  Corporate Health Ins., Inc., 220 F.3d at 
643 n.6. The court declined to make “additional inferences” noting that Pegram did not 
“exhaustively discuss the specific kinds of state causes of action that it implied were not 
preempted.”  Id.  A different panel of Fifth Circuit judges has expressed doubt about the 
continuing validity of Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992), 
following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Traveler and Pegram.  Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 
F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2002).  The Roark court held that state-law claims challenging an HMO’s 
mixed eligibility and treatment decisions were not completely preempted by ERISA.  Id. at 308-
09.  Even for pure eligibility decisions, the court appeared inclined to find no pre-emption, but the  
panel of judges who heard Roark v. Humana, Inc. felt constrained to  follow the Corcoran 
precedent:  “If we were writing on a clean slate, or deciding this en banc, the Roarks would have 
a strong case against ERISA preemption.  But, as a panel we are bound by Corcoran.”  307 F.3d 
298, 315 (5th Cir. 2002).  One court, the Third Circuit, chose to interpret Pegram as invoking the 
more familiar quantity/quality distinction, discussed above.  Lazorko v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 273 
F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 72. Pappas, 768 A.2d at 1095. 
 73. The most recent signal of the Court’s curtailment of ERISA preemption came in a case 
giving an expansive reading to the ERISA savings clause, which permits the state regulation of 
insurance, banking, and securities.  Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 122 S.Ct. 2151 (2002).  
Because the case is not relevant to state law court challenges to managed care organization’s 
decisions, a complete discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.  See E. HAAVI MORREIM, 
ERISA TAKES A DRUBBING: IMPLICATIONS OF RUSH PRUDENTIAL FOR HEALTH CARE 
(unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
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branch should generally leave judgments of social value to the legislative 
branch.74 
As lower federal courts attempt to follow the Supreme Court’s mixed 
directions, an uneasy analytical approach to ERISA preemption is beginning to 
emerge in the few cases decided post-Pegram.  That analysis begins with an 
acknowledgement that HMOs, and some other managed care organizations, 
fulfill two roles with respect to their enrollees: an insurer or administrator of a 
health benefit plan and a provider or “arranger” of health care services.75  In 
the first role, the health plan decides only questions of payment; in the second 
role, it also decides whether and how treatment should be delivered.  ERISA 
preempts state law causes of action that challenge the first function, but not the 
second.76  Under this analysis, courts have determined that an enrollee’s state 
law claim alleging that an HMO was negligent in imposing a greater patient 
load on a primary care physician than he could adequately monitor was not 
preempted,77 but state law challenges to an HMO’s administrative decision to 
use physician financial incentives to reduce care were preempted.78 
In sum, in the view of some courts, ERISA preemption turns on the 
quantity/quality distinction, in the view of others, the payment/treatment 
distinction is key, and still others focus on the mixed/pure eligibility 
distinction.  Regardless of the particular nuances, a number of potential 
 
 74. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 233-34 (2000) (“If Congress wishes to restrict its 
approval of HMO practice to certain preferred forms, it may choose to do so.  But the Federal 
Judiciary would be acting contrary to the congressional policy of allowing HMO organizations if 
it were to entertain an ERISA fiduciary claim portending wholesale attacks on existing HMOs 
solely because of their structure”). 
 75. See Bui v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 310 F.3d 1143, 1153 (9th Cir. 2002) (“ERISA does 
not preempt claims of medical malpractice against medical services providers for decisions made 
in the course of treatment or . . . evaluation.  This is true even if those medical services providers 
also serve, at other times, as administrators.”) Cf. Rubin-Schneiderman v. Merit Behavioral Care 
Corp., 163 F. Supp. 2d 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (distinguishing medical necessity determinations 
made by an HMO in its role as a medical provider with similar decisions made by a PPO in its 
role as an administrator that gives patients the ability to choose how to manage their own care by 
offering differing levels of coverage). 
 76. Compare Hammerich v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (M.D. Fla. 
2002) (HMO acts as health care provider when it fails to inform patient or physician of the result 
of a colorectal screening test sent by the HMO to its enrollees), and Bui v. American Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 310 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2002) (company that advised employee to stay in a foreign country 
for medical treatment was acting as a health care provider), with Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare 
Inc., 245 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2001) (HMO acts as plan administrator when it delays in approving 
benefits but acts as a provider when it adopts a policy to discharge newborns from the hospital 
within twenty-four hours). 
 77. Miller v. HealthAmerica Pa., Inc., 50 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 27 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2000) 
(“When an HMO makes staffing arrangements for the doctors who provide the actual medical 
treatment . . . the HMO is acting in its capacity as the ‘arranger’ of medical treatment, and is not 
performing its administrative function.”). 
 78. Bordlemay v. Keystone Health Plans, Inc., 789 A.2d 748, 752-53 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001). 
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avenues have emerged for circumventing ERISA preemption in liability suits 
based on core managed care techniques.  This approach is in stark contrast to 
an earlier analysis in which ERISA was held to preempt any state law claim 
challenging the actions of a managed care organization offered through an 
ERISA plan.79  The variety of inroads, coming simultaneously from different 
lines of cases, is what creates the impression that ERISA preemption is 
eroding. 
Despite this erosion, however, ERISA preemption remains a hill that 
plaintiffs must climb.  For direct liability theories, one experienced lawyer we 
interviewed said that the concern about erosion is “much worse than the 
reality,” based on the actual precedents.  Several lawyers noted that decisions 
finding ways around ERISA are still localized to a few prominent jurisdictions, 
principally the Third Circuit, whereas in other circuits, such as the Tenth and 
the Fifth, the ERISA barrier remains much stronger.80  Most defense lawyers 
we spoke to thought that the recent Supreme Court rulings reaffirm preemption 
“at its core” and raise questions or set limits only at the boundaries.  One 
experienced defense lawyer thought ERISA was “still a great defense” and 
bragged that he had not seen a managed care liability complaint that he could 
not remove, at least, to federal court for a preliminary preemption ruling. 
Thus, at the moment, although ERISA pre-emption is far from absolute, it 
creates substantial uncertainties in the ability of plaintiffs to bring state law 
actions, due to the difficulties in drawing the lines required by the evolving 
analysis. For example, reasonable minds could differ regarding the 
classification of a health plan’s assignment of patients to a physician or its 
enforcement of gatekeeping requirements.  These features are crucial to 
arranging for care, but they also are a means to administer a plan that pays for 
health care services.  Therefore, even if one of these lines of tenuous analysis 
should take hold, much will remain to be refined as the courts struggle to 
determine when an HMO is acting as an administrator and when it is acting as 
a health care provider. 
D. A Horizon without ERISA Preemption 
Most analysts view ERISA preemption as entirely accidental and 
thoughtless as it applies to managed care liability.  (It makes more sense for 
 
 79. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United Healthcare Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992) (Louisiana 
wrongful death statute); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat’l Health Plan, 999 F.2d 2981 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(tortious interference with contractual relationship, medical malpractice, and breach of contract). 
 80. See Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep’t of Ins., 220 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 2000), 
vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122 
S.Ct. 2151 (2002), reinstated as modified, 314 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 2002) (interpreting Texas right-
to-sue law to exclude a cause of action for medical necessity determinations); Moffett v. 
Haliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 291 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2002) (state tort of insurance bad faith 
preempted by ERISA and not saved as a regulation of insurance). 
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improper administration of pension funds, which is the primary focus of the 
ERISA statute.)  However, there are those who would defend ERISA 
preemption as potentially embodying an efficient or fair restriction on 
liability.81  Even if preemption were lifted as a matter of federal law, state 
courts would still need to consider whether arguments in favor of preemption 
justify limiting managed care liability under common law.  A brief analysis of 
common law justifications for limiting tort liability generally, however, 
indicates that managed care organizations would not fare well if they were 
forced to look to the common law for protections in the absence of ERISA 
preemption. 
The most current guidance on the common law comes from the proposed 
Restatement of the Law Third.  There, the American Law Institute recognizes 
that “special problems of principle or policy” can justify decisions not to 
impose liability on an actor.82  Using its analysis, the limitations on liability 
that the managed care industry enjoys might be justified based on the conflict 
between tort liability and the public policy considerations from another 
domain.83  ERISA embodies public policy considerations of national 
uniformity in administration of employee benefits.  However, absent ERISA’s 
legislative mandate, it is completely unconvincing that national uniformity is a 
sufficiently strong policy objective for state courts to relinquish their 
traditional roles in developing tort law.  Moreover, even if uniformity were an 
overriding goal, it would be achieved equally either by uniform liability or 
immunity.  Uniformity by itself does not support setting aside liability. 
A stronger public policy justification would be the potential for liability to 
deter the expansion of managed care and the development and implementation 
of cost containment techniques.  For example, Peter Jacobson has compared 
the favorable treatment afforded to the managed-care industry in its formative 
years to that enjoyed by the early railroad industry.84  While the early railroads 
did not have complete immunity, they enjoyed favorable legal treatment under 
negligence as opposed to a strict liability regime.  Some scholars posited that 
such favorable judicial treatment was afforded as a means to facilitate the 
industry’s evolution during a time when it was key to national economic 
 
 81. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & Alan O. Sykes, The Assault on Managed Care: Vicarious 
Liability, Class Actions, and the Patient’s Bill of Rights, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 625 (2001) 
(acknowledging that ERISA preemption of managed care liability is a tough sell, and withholding 
judgment on whether, ultimately, preemption is justifiable, but observing nonetheless that there 
are some reasons to support preemption). 
 82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 7 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002). 
 83. Cf. id. § 7 cmt. d (“negligence-based liability might interfere with another area of 
[common] law”). 
 84. See PETER D. JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE IN THE 
MANAGED CARE ERA 79-83 (2002). 
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growth.85  However, this historical precedent does not support lifting liability 
altogether, and this justification loses force as the industry in question matures 
and becomes more established. 
Another possible justification that can be drawn from the proposed 
Restatement Third is deference to discretionary decisions of other branches of 
government.86  For instance, one example the Restatement offers is deference 
to governmental decisions that allocate resources or make other policy 
judgments.87  Managed care organizations engage in cost containment 
initiatives at least in part as a result of the federal government’s decision not to 
allocate health care resources through a system of universal coverage, and 
instead as a matter of national policy, to leave the allocation of health care 
resources to the private sector.  Many of the practices in which managed care 
organizations currently engage, including clinically based coverage 
determinations, were specifically authorized in the federal Health Maintenance 
Organization Act of 1973 and its implementing regulations.88  The analogy 
between managed care and governmental allocation decisions, however, is not 
a perfect one.  Governmental authorization of an activity does not demand 
deference to every private action taken in pursuit of that activity.  Holding 
managed care organizations legally accountable for harm caused by the lawful 
methods they adopt does not require the review of a substantive governmental 
decision.  The managed care industry, not government, is allocating societal 
resources, and it is doing so without social consensus or governmental mandate 
concerning either the procedure or the substance of rationing decisions. 
Finally, the proposed Restatement gives “administrability” as a possible 
ground for lifting tort liability.  Negligence-based liability might be waived 
when a category of case poses particular difficulties for courts in gathering 
evidence or drawing doctrinal lines.89  However, these concerns should not be 
overdrawn.  Virtually all areas of tort law, and law generally, present problems 
of administrability to some degree.  Certainly, they exist in the realm of 
managed care liability, which must wrestle with the overlap between tort and 
contract, that is, between coverage and treatment, and must correctly allocate 
responsibility among insurers, providers, employers, and patients.  After 
thorough analysis, some of these concerns do convince us to limit liability in 
certain ways but others are hurdles the law can overcome.  It is not possible to 
reach a complete understanding of these issues, however, until we give careful 
 
 85. See id. 
 86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS  § 7, cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e-300e-17 (2000); 42 
C.F.R. §§  417.100-417.166 (2002). 
 89. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 7, cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002).  The 
comment offers the recent disputes over the manufacture of handguns as a specific example.  E.g., 
Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001). 
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consideration to what is currently known about how liability functions in the 
managed care arena, and how it might function in a horizon beyond ERISA 
preemption.  It is these broad inquiries to which we now turn. 
III.  THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE MANAGED 
CARE INDUSTRY 
A. Deterrence and Costs in Theory 
The shortcomings of the present-day tort system are well known, and will 
not be reiterated here.90  Suffice it to say that the twin goals of compensation 
and deterrence are imperfectly served by tort liability in the health care 
industry.  Malpractice litigation is an expensive, time consuming and imprecise 
mechanism to identify the injured individuals who deserve recovery for harm 
resulting from medical negligence.91  Nor can the shortfalls in meeting the 
compensation goal be justified by effective deterrence.  Despite the easy 
availability of significant amounts of data, leading researchers have largely 
abandoned the effort to prove that medical malpractice litigation deters 
medical errors.92  To the extent there is deterrence, others claim that it is 
excessive, taking the form of so-called “defensive medicine,” but this, too, is 
difficult to prove.93  Even if a general deterrent effect could be proved, that 
effect would be lessened by the uncertainty of sanction for harm resulting from 
the undesirable behavior and the possibility of sanction for harm unrelated to 
bad acts. 
There is no reason to believe that expanding malpractice liability to 
managed care organizations will overcome the well known shortcomings of the 
malpractice regime as applied to physicians and other caregivers.  Under 
theories of vicarious liability, effective use of malpractice liability would 
 
 90. See, e.g., David A. Hyman, Medical Malpractice and the Tort System: What Do We 
Know and What (if Anything) Should We Do About It?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1639, 1640-46 (2002). 
 91. The number of claims filed is significantly smaller than the number of injuries suffered, 
and the claims resulting in recovery are not always supported by good evidence that negligence 
occurred.  See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in 
Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
370 (1991) (comparing incidence of injury with incidence of lawsuits claiming negligence and 
negligence awards).  The modern day malpractice system, briefly described, is one in which some 
individuals harmed by negligence are compensated some of the time; some individuals who 
suffer bad outcomes are compensated despite a lack of proved negligence.  And many who are 
not injured, such as lawyers and their experts, share in the compensation otherwise intended for 
the unfortunate victim of medical error. 
 92. See Hyman, supra note 90, at 1646 (reporting on researchers’ difficulty in proving that 
tort liability deters medical negligence). 
 93. See Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory 
and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1609 (2002) (studies are 
inconclusive). 
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require creating more accurate and efficient quality improvement incentives 
than those created by tort actions against hospitals, physicians, and other 
caregivers.  In the arena of coverage determinations, the aim is for liability to 
cause health plans to do a better job in allocating limited resources to 
competing medical needs.  There is not yet any evidence to show that either 
branch of managed care liability would have these desired effects.  The public 
backlash against the managed care industry provides some reason to suspect 
that, if tort law doctrines are not carefully crafted and directed by an unbiased 
judiciary, the fit between socially undesirable conduct and legal sanction could 
become worse. 
At present, national health care policy delegates the function of controlling 
health care costs to the managed care industry.  Managed care organizations 
ration health care services in private corporate boardrooms, because society 
avoids doing so in public statehouses.94  Cost control in health care is an 
unpopular, if essential, task, and one that is easy to second-guess with 
Rashomon-like hindsight when a medical outcome is bad.  Relying on 
common-law adjudication of liability related to cost containment initiatives 
will place judge and jury in the position of social policy-maker, in the absence 
of clear social consensus about the appropriate means of allocating health care 
resources.  Therefore, the courts inevitably will influence the evolution of 
managed care practices;95 how well or wisely they do so remains to be seen.  
The specter of tort liability could chill innovation in techniques to manage care 
and cost or could lead the managed care industry to abandon the cost-control 
function entirely without another mechanism in place to fulfill that function. 
B. Deterrence and Costs in Practice 
1. Direct Costs 
To learn more about whether any of these possibilities have occurred so 
far, we inquired in our interviews about the costs of litigation and whether 
liability threats affect core managed care strategies.  Quantifiable costs are 
difficult or impossible to obtain.  One measure is to look at aggregate costs of 
liability insurance.  However, much of this liability exposure is self-insured 
and cannot be quantified in this fashion.  For the portion that is insured, health 
plans report their rates have “sky rocketed” in recent years and coverage is 
sometimes hard to find at any price.  Therefore, larger health plans have had to 
 
 94. See David Orentlicher, The Rise and Fall of Managed Care: A Predictable “Tragic 
Choices” Phenomenon, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 411 (2003) (managed care is only the latest of the 
mechanisms that American society has used to avoid making tragic choices in a public forum). 
 95. See Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, Establishing New Legal Doctrine in 
Managed Care: A Model of Judicial Response to Industrial Change, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
813 (1999). 
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increase substantially the level of liability risk that they retain or self-insure.  
One large insurer currently has a deductible of $3 million per case and expects 
this amount to rise; other health plans reported that their deductibles doubled in 
recent years.  One staff model HMO said that it has to self-insure entirely for 
vicarious liability because, due to the large number of childbirths it covers 
under a managed Medicaid program, its cost of coverage had increased so 
much.  Other HMOs are too small to retain substantial risk, and they are forced 
to pay substantial increases in liability premiums.  One defense lawyer noted 
that health plans he represents have “huge” liability limits that make no sense 
to him, such as $100 million per case. 
Most defense-oriented lawyers attributed the increased costs and 
difficulties in finding liability coverage to the class action lawsuits and the 
handful of very large punitive damage awards, both noted above.  Several 
knowledgeable lawyers, however, opined that difficulties with liability 
coverage are due more to general trends in the property and casualty insurance 
industry than to the experience with managed care specifically.  They noted 
general financial problems at Lloyds of London, industry consolidation leading 
to a shortage of liability insurers in the market and the tendency of insurers’ to 
alternate between artificially low rates to “buy business” and substantial 
premium increases to recover from the losses that result. 
For cases that are self-insured, the most direct measure of liability costs is 
the average cost of litigating and settling cases, referred to jointly as “case 
severity.”  Several defense lawyers explained that liability risk causes health 
plans to settle claims for substantial amounts, even when the health plan 
believes it is not at fault, to avoid the potential for very large verdicts.  One 
health plan lawyer explained that his company is eager to “get rid of cases 
early” because it prefers to deal with certainty.  “Certainty is something that 
business people can evaluate; they can’t evaluate the risk of an open-ended 
judgment that could be in the millions.”  This same health plan said its case 
severity (average cost to resolve) had increased 33% in a year.  This health 
plan lawyer and other lawyers also noted, however, that the cost of resolution 
is also driven by legal costs, which have increased due to the increasing 
difficulty of having to defend ERISA pre-emption issues. 
2. Indirect Costs 
As significant as these direct costs might be, of greater importance are the 
indirect costs or benefits of liability caused by the deterrence, possibly 
excessive, of managed care techniques designed to contain health care 
expenditures or improve quality.  Overall, the predominant view in our 
interviews was that liability is not a primary driver of how managed care 
activities are conducted.  Even a number of those who thought that liability 
exposure was high felt that massive verdicts are too unpredictable to form the 
basis for making major strategic or operational decisions.  “There isn’t much 
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you can do about” these cases, “they just come out of the blue.”  Several 
subjects thought that the negative publicity from lawsuits was as much or more 
threatening than the actual liability, but that health plans would face the “moral 
liability of the press” in any event, regardless of the degree of legal liability. 
Accordingly, the formation of networks, the credentialing of providers, the 
use of financial incentives and the management of utilization all appear to be 
driven mainly by market forces, regulatory constraints and general public 
reactions, rather than by liability.  For instance, virtually no subject said that 
liability deters the use of financial incentives, or induces health plans to 
abandon gatekeeping or to change their network strategy by creating either 
smaller more tightly managed networks or larger unmanaged ones.  Although 
many of these changes are occurring, they are attributed to market or 
regulatory forces rather than liability concerns.96 
 There was a much more deeply divided reaction about liability’s impact 
on utilization management.  A number of subjects felt that, here too, liability is 
not a major driver of behavior or change.  Several health plan officials said that 
liability concerns are not on their minds at all when making coverage 
decisions.  One experienced health plan lawyer explained that liability is often 
one of many factors that health plan managers have to balance in making 
decisions about business operations, but it is rarely determinative.  Often there 
are “strong feelings” or a “real passion” internally about programs they think 
“add real value,” so they go ahead despite liability concerns, although they 
might make a “few changes” to lessen the liability risk.  For instance, no 
interview subject said that liability is a major deterrent to increased use of 
disease management programs, which target chronic illnesses such as asthma 
or diabetes where poor care increases costs and morbidity.  And, liability was 
not given as a reason for delegating utilization management functions to 
independent contractors, perhaps because there is little confidence that doing 
so will insulate the health plan from liability.97  Despite the large differential 
that exists in the actual liability exposure for these market segments, coverage 
processes and criteria are acknowledged, almost uniformly, to be the same for 
purchasers covered by ERISA preemption and those who are not.  One health 
plan said that even enactment of a federal liability bill, which would overturn 
ERISA preemption, would not cause it to make significant changes in its 
 
 96. One experienced health lawyer said that liability has a “huge chilling effect” on the 
willingness of large provider groups to take on full insurance risk through global capitation, since 
this exposes them to the same liability as health plans.  “When the lawyers explain it that way, . . . 
these provider organizations [ask themselves] if they really want that kind of exposure.”  
However, this same lawyer said that these large provider contracting organizations are “falling 
apart” for other, financial reasons, not due to liability.  Therefore, global capitation would be on 
the wane regardless of liability concerns. 
 97. Some subjects noted that this allows health plans to seek indemnification from another 
party if they are found liable. 
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utilization management practices because it feels like it has a good system in 
place already. 
A second group of health plan representatives said that liability concerns 
were “on the back of their minds” when making coverage decisions and caused 
them to be “a little gun shy” or to exercise “a lot more caution” in denying 
coverage.  One patient advocate thought that liability makes it easier to get the 
health plan’s attention when trying to resolve a coverage issue since, before the 
liability statute in the advocate’s state, HMOs thought they were “bullet 
proof.”  One representative of a health plan, that has been hit with a major 
verdict, claimed that its “nurse managers approve everything now” because 
“they’re afraid of” both lawsuits and negative press from another bad case.  
Another observer felt that health plan medical directors are more affected by 
the threat of professional discipline than by liability, but still they are more 
conscious now than before about being held personally responsible for bad 
outcomes.  One health plan lawyer somewhat surprisingly said that liability 
had positive effects by making health plans more careful about “getting it 
right.”  He thought that, “always, some good comes out of being sued” because 
it makes people more diligent.  Therefore, “there are some benefits to putting 
the horn in the meat grinder.”  One insightful lawyer explained that big 
lawsuits, although rare, have a pronounced impact on investors and, therefore, 
on stock prices.  Since managers of large publicly traded health insurers “run 
the business to please Wall Street,” they are especially eager to avoid giving 
plaintiffs’ lawyers reason to sue them.  In this lawyer’s view, “every once in a 
while an MCO should say ‘no, we aren’t covering that,’ and take the risk of the 
lawsuit, but they don’t want Wall Street getting shaken up.” 
The deterrent effect of liability was noted both on the processes and the 
substance of coverage decisions.  Regarding process, subjects from several 
points of view said that the need to defend coverage decisions in court has 
caused health plans to rely more on objective medical criteria that can be 
documented in the medical literature, rather than on the subjective opinion of 
medical directors.  One health plan said that the liability threat makes its 
medical director more likely to consult an outside expert to back up a coverage 
denial he thinks might be challenged in court, and another health plan said that 
liability made them “more serious” about meeting deadlines for making and 
reviewing coverage decisions.  Another health plan was prompted by large 
punitive damage awards to review its practices and criteria thoroughly to see if 
it was doing any of the things that produced these verdicts, and to make some 
adjustments that would allow it to better defend its decisions in court.  The 
health plan created a “concierge service” or “member advocacy program” to 
intervene earlier in cases that have a higher likelihood of producing a dispute, 
so they can work out compatible solutions earlier in the process before the case 
gets too far “downstream.”  The goal is to “infuse medical criteria” more 
thoroughly, consistently and earlier in the coverage determination process.  
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However, a lawyer with this health plan was unable to identify any specific 
substantive coverage criteria that have been changed primarily due to liability 
concerns.  The changes were predominantly procedural.  Another plan said it 
reviewed and improved its processes when a managed care liability statute was 
first enacted in the state because it originally thought the statute would produce 
a lot of litigation.  The changes remain in place, even though little litigation 
has ensued. 
Regarding the substance of coverage decisions, the difficultly in defining 
when it is or is not “prudent” for patients to go to the emergency room (under 
the statutorily required “prudent layperson” standard in most states)98 has 
caused many health plans to routinely approve coverage for virtually all 
emergency visits.  Furthermore, many health plans are reluctant or unwilling to 
deny coverage for high-dose chemotherapy with autologous bone marrow 
transplantation (HDCT-ABMT) for breast cancer, due to a prominent set of 
mixed results in court,99 even though recent clinical trials have, in the minds of 
most experts, proven the procedure to be ineffective.100 
Liability also affects how health plans exercise the discretionary authority 
they may have to deviate from contractual coverage limitations.  One 
experienced lawyer said that, due to liability concerns, health plans are more 
willing to settle coverage disputes “extra-contractually,” that is, agree to pay 
for something they believe is not covered by the insurance policy, especially 
where the patient has already incurred the cost at his physician’s 
recommendation.  A health plan gave as an example its willingness to pay for 
one patient’s referral to a specialist in Europe, after concluding that treatment 
would not cost more than in the U.S.  Other lawyers, however, said that health 
plans are less willing to make exceptions for “sympathy reasons” for fear that 
this will set a precedent that will later be held against them as an indication of 
being “arbitrary and capricious” when they deny the same procedure for 
another patient, a point that was reiterated by some health plan officials. 
Beyond these particular components of managed care, some subjects 
commented on liability’s more global effect on managed care, as part of the 
 
 98. David A. Hyman, Consumer Protection in a Managed Care World: Should Consumers 
Call 911?, 43 VILL. L. REV. 409 (1998). 
 99. Mark A. Hall & Gerard Anderson, Models of Rationing: Health Insurers’ Assessment of 
Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637 (1992); Richard S. Saver, Reimbursing New 
Technologies: Why Are the Courts Judging Experimental Medicine?, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1095 
(1992); William Giese, Adjudication of Third Party Payment for High Dose Chemotherapy and 
Bone Marrow Rescue in the Treatment of Breast Cancer, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 205 
(1997). 
 100. Marc E. Lippman, High-Dose Chemotherapy plus Autologous Bone Marrow 
Transplantation for Metastatic Breast Cancer, 342 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1119 (2000); Edward A. 
Stadtmauer et al., Conventional-Dose Chemotherapy Compared with High-Dose Chemotherapy 
plus Autologous Hematopoietic Stem-Cell Transplantation for Metastatic Breast Cancer, 342 
NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1069 (2000). 
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overall climate of anti-managed care “backlash.”  One knowledgeable lawyer 
was particularly forceful in observing that liability is one factor that has caused 
most major national health plans to move away from managing care as their 
primary means of adding value to the insurance product.  Instead, they are 
embracing the principle of enhancing consumer choice, which entails 
increasing patients’ responsibility for paying more of their costs out of pocket: 
Managed care organizations are looking ahead and concluding that the risk is 
such that this isn’t a place they want to be in the market anymore.  They 
weren’t intending to be a deep pocket for creative plaintiffs’ lawyers.  That is 
not the “benefit of the bargain” they thought they were getting when they 
wrote managed care policies. . . . You’re dealing with the whole litigiousness 
of society and a particularly unpopular [image].  If you’re a CEO of an 
insurer/MCO, you don’t want to put your shareholders in harm’s way. . . .  
When the bad events occurred in managed care, the industry didn’t want to 
stand up and say, “we screwed up.”  Instead, they made like “wounded animals 
in a corner.”  . . .  People got really upset about that because the MCOs were 
trying to duck when they really made a mistake.  Insurers are finally waking up 
and realizing that the managed care model might not be a good model these 
days.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers can make pretty compelling cases.  Even if liability is 
warranted, it will be assessed because MCOs are so unsympathetic. 
  The move away from [utilization review and medical necessity denials] is 
both market-driven and driven by fears of liability. . . . Employers are hearing 
a lot about choice; some of what they are being told might be reliable.  But, 
overall, employees are joining the consumer-empowerment approach.  They 
want to make decisions about their own care.  And plans are making decisions 
to avoid potential liability.  There are two flows that have come together that 
have really pushed some of the changes in the marketplace. 
This viewpoint was confirmed by another knowledgeable health lawyer, 
who said that both liability and market forces are behind the shift in recent 
years away from HMOs benefit designs and towards PPOs, which entail fewer 
managed care restrictions.  He also attributed the current level of interest in 
moving from comprehensive coverage to much higher deductibles and co-
payments to a combination of market forces and liability concerns.101  He 
noted that if a treatment decision goes wrong due to the patient’s own concerns 
about costs, the health plan couldn’t be blamed.  Despite a role for liability 
concerns in recent shifts in benefit design, this subject felt that market forces 
are the main drivers of these changes. 
 
 101. James C. Robinson, Renewed Emphasis on Consumer Cost Sharing in Health Insurance 
Benefit Design, HEALTH AFF., May 2002, at 16; Victor R. Fuchs, What’s Ahead for Health 
Insurance in the United States? 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1822 (2002); Jason S. Lee & Laura 
Tollen, How Low Can You Go? The Impact of Reduced Benefits and Increased Cost Sharing, 
HEALTH AFF., June 2002, at 11 at www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/ 
Lee_Web_Excl_062902.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2002). 
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Other health plans have not backed away from utilization management, 
gatekeeping or financial incentives either for liability or for economic reasons.  
One health plan lawyer was especially forceful in stating a “real passion” for 
the value that managed care can bring to health insurance.  In her view, there is 
no reason to be in the business if patient protection laws, including liability 
provisions, are seen as making it impossible to engage in programs such as 
disease management for reduction of asthma in inner city children.  She sees it 
as “unfortunate” that lawyers have to “stand over the shoulders” of medical 
directors who undertake these “really neat, innovative” programs to remind 
them about aspects of the initiatives that could increase the plan’s liability 
exposure.  So far, her colleagues have gone ahead and done what they think is 
“the right thing to do” despite liability concerns, which she “hopes” will 
continue to be the case. 
3. In Search of Optimal Deterrence 
In resolving these competing considerations, two distinct realms must be 
clearly differentiated: secondary liability for the negligence of treating 
physicians and primary liability for harm caused by managed care restrictions 
such as wrongful coverage denials. 
Vicarious Liability.  Regarding health plans’ liability for physicians’ 
medical negligence, legal scholars have staked out two polar positions.  At one 
extreme, some scholars, including Patricia Danzon and Richard Epstein, argue 
that health plan liability would be redundant and add unnecessary costs, 
because physicians are already on the line for liability and are well insured.102  
Contractual arrangements between physicians and managed care organizations 
can reallocate this liability if it is efficient to do so.  However, courts should 
not adopt a default position that assumes that health plans are well positioned 
to monitor, improve and take responsibility for the quality of care delivered by 
physicians in their networks. 
At the other extreme, scholars including Clark Havighurst and Bill Sage 
argue that managed care organizations should be not only fully liable but, in 
the case of Sage, exclusively liable, for physician negligence.103  This view is 
consistent with the Institute of Medicine’s recent report, To Err is Human, 
 
 102. See, e.g., Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Liability: A Minefield for Managed Care?, 26 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 491 (1997) (liability for negligent care should rest solely with caregivers and health 
plan liability should be based on contract); Richard A. Epstein, Vicarious Liability of Health 
Plans for Medical Injuries, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 581 (2000). 
 103. See William M. Sage, Enterprise Liability and the Emerging Health Care System, 60 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159 (1997) (recommending legislatively imposed enterprise liability); 
Clark C. Havighurst, Vicarious Liability: Relocating Responsibility for the Quality of Medical 
Care, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2000) (absent a different contractual agreement, health plans should 
be vicariously and exclusively liable for torts committed by health care providers with whom they 
contract). 
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which identified health care systems as the most effective means to address the 
inevitable failings of individual caregivers,104 and supported by indications that 
managed care organizations are not taking their quality control role 
seriously.105  The potential for vicarious liability for health care services 
provides an incentive for managed care organizations to take steps to minimize 
the opportunity for medical errors. 
We take an intermediate position in the vicarious liability debate.106  For 
staff model HMOs, there is no justification to depart from normal rules of 
respondeat superior that apply to any type of employee, including physician 
employees.  For preferred provider organizations (PPOs), which allow patients 
free movement within and outside of broad networks composed of independent 
contractors, it is very difficult to justify a strong position of enterprise liability, 
and no courts have gone this far.  In between these extremes are a host of 
hybrids that partake in different degrees of the respective policies and 
precedents that inform these two polar positions.  These hybrids include: 
provider based HMOs where smaller networks of independent hospitals and 
physicians are closely affiliated with the HMO; traditional HMOs that use the 
gatekeeping concept but with extensive provider networks; direct access 
HMOs, which require patients to stay within the network, but remove the 
gatekeeping feature that requires permission before going to a network 
specialist; and point-of-service plans, which, like PPOs, allow patients to opt 
out of the network, but like HMOs, may impose gatekeeping if patients choose 
to stay in the network.  Added to this complexity are a variety of different 
contractual and ownership arrangements between managed care organizations 
and provider organizations, such as “delegated networks,” in which large 
provider groups assume most of the financial risk of health care services for a 
defined population through global capitation. 
 
 104. COMMITTEE ON QUALITY HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR 
IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000). 
 105. The Office of Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services has 
suggested that managed care organizations were not taking quality control duties seriously, 
basing this assertion in part of a finding that managed care organizations do not notify the 
National Practitioner Data Bank of adverse actions taken against physicians with whom they 
contract.  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR 
GENERAL, MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATION NONREPORTING TO THE NATIONAL PRACTITIONER 
DATA BANK: A SIGNAL FOR BROADER CONCERN (2001). 
 106. Our position is similar to, but distinct from, the position that Haavi Morriem develops in 
her recent book, in which she distinguishes between resource allocation decisions that are subject 
only to contractual standards, and issues of medical expertise, which are subject to tort standards.  
MORRIEM, supra note 73.  We question whether this distinction can be drawn as cleanly as it 
needs to be for this approach to be workable.  Also, even for pure resource allocation decisions, a 
contractual approach requires the development of tort-like standards of liability when breach of 
contractual obligations leads to personal injury. 
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The most sensible way to deal with the daunting complexity and variety of 
these arrangements is to continue to allow common law to evolve principles of 
vicarious liability on a case-by-case basis.  This evolution is not being 
hampered by ERISA preemption; therefore, this area of law is not crying out 
for legislative reform.  The only obstacle to an orderly evolution based on 
organizational structure are some archaic precedents in a few states that hold 
HMOs immune from vicarious liability under the corporate practice of 
medicine doctrine.  The states that initially adopted this position, either by 
statute or case law, have now reversed it through one or the other means.107  
Therefore, for now, we opt to leave well enough alone. 
Coverage Denials.  Liability for coverage denials is quite another matter.  
This area cries out for legal reform due, on the one hand, to ERISA’s 
interference with common law development, and, on the other hand, to 
extraordinary punitive damages approaching $100 million that juries have 
awarded in several cases so far not covered by ERISA preemption.  Neither 
state of affairs is sustainable. 
Managed care organizations cannot justify being exposed only to 
contractual damages for blatant breaches of their obligation to authorize 
essential medical care for individual patients.108  If liability exposure were to 
be increased for core managed care activities, deterrence could lead to system-
wide improvements in cost containment efforts.  Managed care organizations 
could minimize the risk of liability through the adoption of scientifically valid 
standards to establish coverage policy and guide clinically based benefit 
determinations in individual cases.109  Managed care organizations might be 
encouraged to select skilled and careful clinical decision-makers, supply them 
with proper information and tools, assign them to areas within their expertise, 
and monitor their performance.  The development and use of quality assurance 
programs for clinically based benefit determinations and coverage policy could 
detect defects in design or implementation of managed-care cost-containment 
systems.110 
The concern that some liability exposure might over-deter cost-
containment activities should not be overstated.  There is some reason to 
believe that managed care organizations are better positioned to process 
liability signals than are individual clinicians.  Actuarial projections of liability 
 
 107. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39. 
 108. See supra text accompanying notes 80-89. 
 109. See Eleanor D. Kinney, The Brave New World of Medical Standards of Care, 29 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 323, 326-27 (2001) (discussing the role of medical standards in managed care). 
 110. Moreover, if disclosure and consent were an affirmative defense to challenges to cost 
containment initiatives, the risk of liability could encourage transparency in system design and 
incentives.  See MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAW, ETHICS, & 
ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS 194-98 (1997) (discussing disclosure of rationing 
mechanisms during insurance enrollment). 
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can be more precise with the larger volume of patient encounters involved in a 
managed care enterprise than with individual physicians.  The economic 
signals sent by judgments against managed care organizations, therefore, 
should not be as distorted as those sent by the medical malpractice system 
against individual caregivers.  Although physicians are widely believed to 
engage in over-deterrence through the so-called defensive practice of medicine 
as a result of their fear of medical malpractice actions, managed care 
organizations are in the business of spreading risk, and, with time and 
experience, should be more able to gauge their response to the increased risk of 
liability.  In addition, the available evidence indicates this over-deterrence has 
not yet become the dominant explanation for increasing medical costs.111  The 
managed care industry, however, cannot serve the resource allocation mission 
assigned to it by society, and many individual companies could not survive in 
any form, if ERISA preemption were lifted entirely and massive punitive 
awards became commonplace. 
A compromise is needed.  Although a middle course could evolve through 
common law adjudication, legislative intervention is more likely to achieve a 
well-considered balance by crafting a rule of liability for clinically based 
coverage denials that imposes accountability for the personal injury that can 
result from a managed care organization’s malfeasance, but that does not 
excessively deter setting limits that are necessary to honor the contractual 
terms of affordable insurance coverage.  As the next section reveals, recent 
legislative initiatives have not yet achieved that goal. 
IV.  LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES 
Both state and federal legislatures are actively engaged with attempting to 
formulate optimal liability rules for managed care.  Congress has twice 
attempted, but has yet to enact legislation to moderate the effects of ERISA 
preemption.112  Since 1997, eleven states have enacted variants of laws that 
create a “right to sue your HMO.”113  Although ERISA preemption remains a 
 
 111. See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
 112. In the 106th Congress, the House of Representatives passed the Norwood-Dingell 
Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, but the Senate failed to act, and Congress adjourned 
without enacting managed care reform.  Until the events of September 11 changed the 107th 
Congress’ priorities, Congress was again moving toward legislation that would expand managed 
care liability and clarify ERISA preemption of state law.  On June 29, 2001, the Senate passed 
patient protection legislation.  Bipartisan Patient Protection Act, S. 1052, 107th Cong. (2001).  On 
August 2, the House of Representatives passed its version.  Bipartisan Patient Protection Act, 
H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. (2001).  The events of September 11 delayed further consideration and 
attempts at reconciliation of the House and Senate enactments. 
 113. See PATRICIA BUTLER, KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE MANAGED CARE 
ORGANIZATION LIABILITY LAWS (2001), available at www.kff.org (citing and discussing ten 
such laws; North Carolina has since become the eleventh state to enact right-to-sue legislation). 
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major uncertainty,114 these laws are receiving a lot of attention.  Similar 
legislation has been pending in Congress for several years which, if enacted, 
would resolve the ERISA preemption issue and create a combined federal and 
state liability regime.  For purposes of this Article, two aspects of these right-
to-sue laws are germane: the scope of activities for which a managed care 
entity can be held liable, and the standard of care against which the managed 
care entity’s conduct will be measured.  In general, these statutes are aimed at 
coverage determinations rather than vicarious liability for the quality of care, 
and they require “ordinary care” rather than a professional or medical standard 
of care.  They leave the precise parameters of “ordinary care” to common law 
adjudication. 
A. Scope of Activities and Standards of Care 
Texas was the first state to enact right-to-sue legislation in 1997.115  The 
statute imposes a duty on managed care organizations to “exercise ordinary 
care when making health care treatment decisions.”116  In an apparent attempt 
to take advantage of the quality/quantity distinction noted above, the Texas 
legislature defined a health care treatment decision as a determination made 
when medical services were provided that affected the quality of those 
services.117  Regarding the standard of care, the statute contains a subtle, but 
important, distinction, according to whether the actor is the managed care 
entity, or is an individual professional acting for the organization.  “Ordinary 
care” for the entity is to be measured against “ordinary prudence” by a 
managed care entity in the same or similar circumstances, but “ordinary care” 
for an individual decision-maker is defined by reference to a standard of care 
 
 114. This uncertainty arises from an unresolved conflict in ERISA’s two sources of pre-
emption.  The primary pre-emption clause saves from pre-emption state laws that regulate 
insurance, and, after the Court’s decision in RushPrudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122 S. Ct. 2151 
(2002), it seems clear that these liability statutes meet the test for regulating insurance.  However, 
another part of ERISA creates an exclusive federal remedy to enforce rights under ERISA, which 
the Court has construed as a jurisdictional bar to remedies in state court.  Pilot Life Insurance Co. 
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48 (1987).  It is unclear which provision trumps the other.  In Rush 
Prudential, the Court reserved judgment on this question, but four justices clearly would find 
preemption, and the other five conceded, at least in dictum, that preemption is suggested by prior 
decisions. 
 115. Texas averted ERISA preemption by asserting that its scope was limited to claims of 
vicarious liability for negligence of plan physicians, despite the plain language of the statute that 
appears to envision broader liability.  Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep’t of Ins., 215 F.3d 
526 (5th Cir. 2000), reh’g denied Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Department of Ins., 220 
F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 2000), vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Rush Prudential 
HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122 S.Ct. 2151 (2002), reinstated as modified, 314 F.3d 782 (5th Cir. 
2002).  See infra text accompanying notes 141-42. 
 116. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(a) (Vernon 2002). 
 117. Id. § 88.001(5). 
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for other professionals of the same type.118  Coupled with the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, this distinction would have the effect of holding managed 
care organizations that employ their physician-medical directors to the medical 
professional standard of care.  Maine, North Carolina and Oklahoma later 
adopted substantially similar statutes, imposing a duty of ordinary care on 
managed care entities making health care decisions.119  Those statutes, 
however, did not include a standard-of-care distinction for employed medical 
directors. 
Other states have relied on the managed care entity’s role as insurer in their 
attempt to justify an ability to regulate the industry in a manner that might 
escape ERISA preemption.  California, for example, referenced its authority to 
regulate the business of insurance120 when it imposed a duty of “ordinary care” 
on managed care entities arranging for the provision of medically necessary 
services and created a private right of action for individuals harmed by denial, 
delay, or modification of care that resulted from a managed care entity’s 
breach of its duty.121  Although “delay and denial” are terms more common to 
insurers than caregivers, the California legislature stated that the duty it 
imposed and the remedy the law provided were “necessary to protect the health 
and safety” of state residents.122  Only enrollees who suffer “substantial harm” 
are eligible to sue.123  New Jersey also used language common to insurers in 
imposing liability for a managed care entity’s “negligence” in denying or 
delaying approval of medically necessary covered services.  Arizona law 
created a variant of a common-law bad faith denial of coverage claim.  It 
provides a private right of action for individuals harmed by health care 
insurers’ delay or failure to authorize medically necessary services, but only in 
 
 118. Compare id. § 88.001(10) (“Ordinary care” for an employee or agent of a managed care 
entity making the health care treatment decision is measured against the “degree of care that a 
person of ordinary prudence in the same profession, specialty, or area of practice . . . in the same 
or similar circumstances.”), with  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 4301-A (West 2001) 
(ordinary care for both the health plan and its agents defined by reference to ordinary prudence 
under the same or similar circumstances). 
 119.  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 4313 (West 2001) (carrier has “the duty to exercise 
ordinary care when making health care treatment decisions that affect the quality of diagnosis, 
care or treatment”); N.C. GEN. STAT.  § 90-21.51 (2001) (managed care entity has “the duty to 
exercise ordinary care when making health care decisions”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 6593 
(West 2002) (“managed care entity . . . has the duty to exercise ordinary care when making health 
care treatment decisions”). 
 120.  1999 CAL. STAT. 536 § 2(a)(1) (“all managed care entities regulated under the [Act] are 
engaged in the business of insurance in this state”). 
 121. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3428 (West 2001). 
 122. 1999 CAL. STAT. 536 § 2(b), codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 3428 (West 2001). 
 123. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3428(b) (West 2001) (substantial harm includes loss of life, loss or 
significant impairment of limb or bodily function, significant disfigurement, severe and chronic 
physician pain, or significant financial loss). 
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circumstances in which the insurer “knew that it acted without a reasonable 
basis or failed to perform an investigation or evaluation adequate to determine 
whether its action was supported by a reasonable basis.”124  A managed care 
entity can defend against such claims by asserting that its conduct was 
“inadvertent or unintentional.”125 
Two states, Georgia and Washington, purport to measure managed care 
liability against a medical professional standard.  Washington requires a 
“health care carrier [to] adhere to the accepted standard of care for health care 
providers . . . when arranging for the provision of medically necessary health 
care services to its enrollees.”126  Similarly, Georgia requires entities that 
administer benefits or review or adjust health care claims to act in accordance 
“with the practices and standards of the profession of the health care provider 
generally.”127 
Both the House and the Senate bills that were passed (but not enacted) in 
the 107th Congress would expand the potential liability of managed care 
organizations for their own actions and permit monetary damages for personal 
injuries resulting from negligent benefit determinations for ERISA plan 
beneficiaries.  The Senate bill would accomplish this result by creating a new 
cause of action against ERISA plans for negligent benefit denials that are 
based on the terms of the coverage contract.128  Managed care entities offered 
through ERISA plans could be held liable if they failed to exercise “ordinary 
care” in making decisions about eligibility or coverage.  Ordinary care would 
be measured against the care, skill, and diligence exercised by a “reasonable 
and prudent individual.”129  The Senate bill would eliminate ERISA 
preemption of state law causes of action challenging coverage determinations 
that are based on clinical criteria, so-called medically reviewable decisions.130  
This action would put ERISA plan beneficiaries on equal footing with other 
managed care enrollees.  While these claims could be brought under state law, 
they would be subject to federal damage limits.131 
 
 124. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-3153(A)(2) (2001). 
 125. Id. § 20-3153(B)(2). 
 126. WASH. REV. CODE  § 48.43.545(1)(a) (2002). 
 127. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-48(a) (2000). 
 128. S. 1052, 107th Cong. § 402 (2001) (amending § 502 of ERISA). 
 129. Id. § 402 (amending § 502 of ERISA by adding (n)(4)(A)). 
 130. Id. § 402(b) (amending § 514 of ERISA by adding (d)) (“PREEMPTION NOT TO 
APPLY TO CAUSES OF ACTION UNDER STATE LAW INVOLVING MEDICALLY 
REVIEWABLE DECISIONS”).  Medically reviewable decisions would include claim denials 
based on an evaluation of medical facts about a specific patient, including, but not limited to, 
determinations of medically necessity or appropriateness and experimental or investigational 
determinations.  Id. § 104(d)(2). 
 131. Id. § 104(d)(1). 
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The House bill would create a cause of action for ERISA plan beneficiaries 
harmed by benefit determination,132 but it also would prohibit courts from 
classifying disputes about coverage determinations as challenges to the quality 
of medical care under state tort law.133  Like the Senate version, the House bill 
would impose a standard of ordinary care measured against a reasonable and 
prudent person, although unlike the Senate bill, this standard would apply to all 
benefit determinations including those based on evaluation of clinical 
information.134  Presumably, the House version would require the development 
of a federal common law of negligence to address benefit determinations based 
on clinical criteria.  How the differences between the two proposals will be 
resolved, and more fundamentally whether any federal legislation will be 
enacted, remains uncertain. 
B. Initial Impact of State Laws 
The state right-to-sue laws have not been on the books long enough for 
lawsuits to make their way through the courts in any number.  Therefore, it is 
too early to know what impact the state laws will have.  To date, however, 
there is no evidence of the much ballyhooed “flood of litigation” that was 
predicted when the ERISA shield began to erode and states enacted right-to-
sue laws.135  According to Texas lawyers we interviewed, from the time of its 
enactment in 1997 until July 2001, when the first jury verdict was handed out, 
only about a dozen  lawsuits were filed under the Texas right to sue law, and 
the stream of cases since then has “gone down to almost nothing,” far less than 
anyone ever expected.  The first case filed, Plocica v. NYLCare Health Plans 
Inc, was settled in 2000, and the first jury verdict exonerated the HMO.136  A 
second jury verdict awarded $13 million (including $10 million in punitive 
damages) against Cigna for prematurely discharging a nursing home patient 
 
 132. Bipartisan Patient Protection Act, H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. § 402(1) (2001). 
 133. Id. § 402(a) (amending § 502 of ERISA by adding (n)(9)) (“A cause of action that is 
based on or otherwise relates to a group health plan’s determination on a claim for benefits shall 
not be deemed to be the delivery of medical care under any State law . . . . Any such cause of 
action shall be maintained exclusively under [the amended section of ERISA]”). 
 134. Id. § 402(16)(E) (defining ordinary care).  ERISA plan participants could file challenges 
to benefit determinations in either federal or state court, but such claims would be adjudicated 
under federal law. 
 135. See Jake Tapper, The Healthcare Disaster that Wasn’t, at SALON.COM (July 17, 2001) 
(quoting then Governor George W. Bush on the potential for the legislation to drive up costs and 
increase the number of law suits).  For further explanation of why this has not occurred, see 
Carole Gresenz, et al., A Flood of Litigation? Predicting the Consequences of Changing Legal 
Remedies Available to ERISA Beneficiaries, RAND CORP. ISSUE PAPER (1999), available at 
http://www.rand.org/publications/IP/IP184/. 
 136. See Mary Alice Robbins, Defendants Score in First Test of Texas Health Liability Act, 
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July 19, 2001, at 4 (reporting on both the earlier Plocica settlement and 
Brewer v. Chang, the first case to reach a jury). 
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who died.137  Other cases were settled, dismissed based on ERISA preemption, 
or are still pending.  Only a handful of suits have been filed in all the other 
states combined with these statutes, and, to the knowledge of the experienced 
lawyers we interviewed, several of these states have had no suits filed yet. 
Lawyers on both sides of the table reported that the state right-to-sue laws 
have not yet made a large difference in managed care liability.  Defense 
lawyers view them as merely “another arrow in the quiver” of plaintiffs’ 
lawyers.  Health plan lawyers consistently said they were not “quaking in their 
boots,” but were taking a “wait and see” attitude toward the statutes.  Although 
there was at first “a lot of worry,” one lawyer said, “after more sober cost-
benefit analysis,” health plans do not see these statutes creating any major new 
source of liability.  For their part, most plaintiffs’ lawyers reported that the 
plaintiffs’ bar was not suddenly saying “let’s attack HMOs now.”  While 
plaintiffs’ lawyers were interested in seeing the statutes tested, most of the 
ones we spoke to, including some who reviewed several hundred potential 
cases of malpractice each year, reported that they had not yet seen the right set 
of facts for a test case, one that clearly pointed to the health plan as a primary 
wrongdoer.  Even the most active plaintiffs’ lawyer in Texas said that he turns 
down about twenty cases for every one he takes. 
Many patient advocates agree with these lawyers’ assessment that the state 
statutes have had only a marginal impact on managed care liability.  One 
advocate from New Jersey said that, even though the New Jersey statute had 
been “waived around as another great consumer protection” and characterized 
as a version of liability that was stronger than that contained in a pending 
federal bill, nothing had happened under the statute in its first year.  However, 
a patient advocate in Texas thought that the right to sue is still an important 
protection, even if it is rarely used, because it is a patient’s only recourse if 
injury has already occurred from a treatment denial. 
The dearth of litigation activity was attributed to several factors in the 
interviews we conducted.138  Few lawyers see the right-to-sue statutes as 
creating any fundamentally new theories of liability.  At their core, most of 
these statutes create a form of liability akin to liability for “bad faith” denial of 
insurance benefits.139  A few states seemingly intended to create a medical 
 
 137. Jury Awards $13 Million Against HMO For Forcing Patient From Nursing Home, 11 
BNA HEALTH L. REP. 1005 (July 11, 2002) (reporting on Pybas v. Cigna HealthCare, the first 
plaintiff’s verdict under the Texas legislation). 
 138. Notably, however, this is not due to the various limitations or qualifications in these 
statutes that some might view as creating hurdles to suing.  For instance, plaintiffs’ lawyers said 
that the list of more serious health conditions one must have in some states to bring suit is not 
limiting since no plaintiffs lawyer would want the case anyway unless the patient had one of these 
conditions.  As one lawyer put it, “I wouldn’t waste the court’s time on whether to have toenails 
trimmed.” 
 139. See supra text accompanying notes 116-23. 
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malpractice type action against the managed care organization for erroneous 
clinical determinations made by its employed medical directors.140  However, 
most interview subjects had a difficult time distinguishing these theories of 
liability from what was already available, at least in theory, under common 
law.141  Although many states lack a clear precedent on point applying these 
types of general tort theories to managed care organizations, most lawyers we 
spoke to thought that it was  “just a matter of time, given the right set of facts” 
before courts would be willing to “hold [managed care organizations] 
responsible for their own decisions.”  State statutes that recognize a right to sue 
health insurers are viewed, for the most part, as merely codifying existing state 
common law theories of liability, not as creating brand new theories of 
liability.142 
The major legal functions of these statutes then will be to establish a 
standard of care for managed care organizations and to attempt to circumvent 
ERISA preemption by invoking the states’ right to regulate insurance or the 
quality of medical care.  Until definitive rulings on ERISA preemption emerge, 
lawyers see a great deal of uncertainty about whether the latter goal will be 
accomplished. 
Uncertainty about ERISA is not the only reason for the absence of state 
litigation under the right-to-sue laws.  It is possible that fewer potential cases 
exist than some might have predicted.  One experienced plaintiffs’ malpractice 
lawyer explained that, in most cases the lawyer reviewed, there was no clear 
cut denial of coverage or interference by the health plan; instead, physicians 
sometimes claimed they failed to offer treatment thinking that it would not 
likely be approved.  If this experience is generalized, it  suggests that the 
liability threat is diminished by the simple fact that managed care 
 
 140. See supra text accompanying notes 112-17. 
 141. For instance, some noted that “ordinary care” is not necessarily a lowering of the 
standard from “bad faith,” since bad faith is used to justify punitive damages, whereas 
compensatory personal injury damages are (or might be) available already under common law 
simply for failing to honor the terms of insurance coverage, whether or not this was done in bad 
faith. 
 142. The major exception to this statement is in the few states such as Texas that previously 
had ruled that HMOs were immune from suit for medical errors based on the statutory prohibition 
on corporations practicing medicine.  For a discussion of corporate-practice of medicine defense, 
see supra text accompanying notes 37-39.  Texas lawyers said that a major impact of the Texas 
statute is to “put a nail in the coffin” of the corporate practice defense to liability.  Even these 
states, however, would likely have recognized liability for injury caused by wrongful denial of 
insurance benefits, which is all that many of the newly enacted state statutes address.  Interview 
subjects in Texas explained, contrary to the conventional wisdom that the corporate practice 
defense barred liability in their state, the defense was seldom successful in court prior to the 
liability statute, and in fact the corporate practice argument was often turned against HMOs, as a 
theory of liability, by arguing that engaging in the illegal corporate practice of medicine 
constituted negligence per se. 
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organizations’ clinically based coverage determinations may be much less 
intrusive on the course of treatment than is commonly believed.  One 
prominent medical malpractice lawyer thought that the absence of  “egregious 
facts” in the cases he screens indicates that the few “horror stories” one hears 
are not “typical day in and day out” cases but instead are “one in a million” 
“anecdotes.”  Another plaintiffs’ lawyer, who also commented that he does not 
see the kinds of “abuses” he used to read or hear about, speculated this is 
because HMOs have “tweaked the system” to eliminate their “worst practices,” 
under pressure from providers and the public backlash.  This observation is 
consistent with other reports that health plans in recent years have lessened 
many managed care controls, such as greatly reducing the number of 
procedures that require prior authorization or allowing patients to go directly to 
specialists without seeking prior approval.143 
Finally, when disputes that implicate a health plan do arise, lawyers 
explained that they are less likely to result in a liability suit as a result of the 
external review programs that have been adopted by most states in recent 
years.144  External review procedures allow patients to appeal coverage denials 
to an independent physician or panel of physicians with relevant qualifications.  
A number of interview subjects from different perspectives (including health 
plans) felt independent external review was a preferable form of dispute 
resolution, one that prevents the harm from occurring in the first place by 
correcting health plan mistakes before they cause harm and that provides a 
speedy and trustworthy resolution of disputes when they arise.  This procedure 
dampens the need for a dissatisfied enrollee to consult a lawyer and seek 
redress in court.  Some defense and plaintiff’s counsel opined that mandating 
external review would also limit the liability exposure for coverage denials to 
any harm caused during the time that external review is pending. 
These views are based only on initial interpretations of these statutes and 
could change dramatically if early court rulings come out differently than 
anticipated.  An experienced health plan lawyer observed that predicting how 
courts will interpret these statutes is difficult, as courts sometimes adopt 
readings that are “surprising.”145  As one health plan executive stated, 
 
 143. See James C. Robinson, The End of Managed Care, 285 JAMA 2622 (2001). 
 144. For a discussion of state external review laws, see KAREN POLITZ ET AL., ASSESSING 
STATE EXTERNAL REVIEW PROGRAMS AND THE EFFECTS OF PENDING FEDERAL PATIENTS’ 
RIGHTS LEGISLATION, available at http://www.kff.org/content/2002/3221/ 
externalreviewpart2rev.pdf. 
 145. For example, she pointed to the Fifth Circuit’s apparently reading the Texas statute as 
applying only to claims of medical negligence by treating physicians despite the fact that the 
statute imposes a duty on “managed care entit[ies] . . . [to] exercise ordinary care when making 
health care treatment decisions.”  Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep’t of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 
534 (5th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added), vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Rush 
Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122 S.Ct. 2151 (2002), reinstated as modified, 314 F.3d 782 (5th 
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“everyone is still trying to figure out” what these statutes will mean, and it’s 
possible they may “end up being a non-event.”  One major issue that will 
determine the impact of these statutes is how courts develop the standard of 
care that applies to personal injury damages resulting from a managed care 
organization’s clinically based decisions. 
V.  REACHING THE MERITS OF CHALLENGES TO BENEFIT DETERMINATIONS 
It is axiomatic that managed care organizations owe their enrollees a duty 
of care.  The measure of that duty, or the requisite standard of care against 
which it will be assessed, is considerably less clear.  Some commentators have 
suggested that private insurance contracts should play the major role in 
defining payors’ obligations.146  For example, contracts might limit coverage 
for rehabilitative services to thirty sessions in a contract year, without regard to 
whether an enrollee could benefit from or will be affirmatively harmed by the 
withholding of additional sessions.  Certainly, such absolute limits should be 
honored and failure to grant exceptions should not be the basis for personal 
injury liability.  Tort suits should not become vehicles for rewriting coverage 
documents that are clear and precise.  However, this approach does little to 
resolve the core issues because coverage within the prescribed limits is defined 
according to open-ended and judgmental concepts such as medically 
necessary, non-experimental, non-custodial and non-cosmetic.  Therefore, 
insurance contracts unavoidably will give insurers discretion to determine 
uncertain issues that require the application of individual clinical 
assessments.147  If, ultimately, it is concluded that the insurer’s judgment was 
arbitrary, unreasonable or simply not correct, the liability that results from any 
misfeasance raises issues cannot be resolved without resort to concepts from 
the domain of tort law. 
 
Cir. 2002).  To be fair, the Fifth Circuit had the assistance of counsel for the State in reaching this 
rather strained reading of the statute.  Corporate Health Ins., Inc. 215 F.3d at 534 (“We agree 
with Texas’ interpretation of the Act.  When the liability provisions are read together, they 
impose liability for a limited universe of events. . . .  [T]he Act would allow suit for claims that a 
treating physician was negligent in delivering medical services . . . .”).  Earlier, we noted our 
speculation that counsel for the State asserted this reading in an attempt to stave off a finding of 
ERISA preemption.  See supra note 115. 
 146. See generally Clark C. Havighurst, Prospective Self-Denial: Can Consumers Contract 
Today to Accept Health Care Rationing Tomorrow?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1755, 1784 (1992) 
(urging greater reliance on private contract to ration health care services); E. HAAVI MORREIM, 
HOLDING HEALTH CARE ACCOUNTABLE (2001) (arguing that health plans should not be liabile in 
tort for clear limitations in coverage). 
 147. See Wendy K. Mariner, Slouching Toward Managed Care Liability: Reflections on 
Doctrinal Boundaries, Paradigm Shifts, and Incremental Reform, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 253, 
256-57 (2001) (“[T]he contract itself will never be adequate to describe what that care should be 
in an individual case.  What the consumer is buying . . . is . . . [a] reasonable judgment about 
patient care.”); see generally HALL, supra note 110. 
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A. Lessons from Wickline and Wilson 
The first reported case alleging that a payer’s decision to withhold payment 
or medical services on the ground that they were not medically necessary for 
the insured was decided little more than fifteen years ago.148  It arose when 
Lois Wickline sued the California State Medicaid program (MediCal) alleging 
that it negligently refused to authorize payment for an eight-day extension of 
inpatient treatment as requested by her physicians, and, instead, agreed to pay 
for four additional days of hospitalization.  At the conclusion of the four-day 
extension Mrs. Wickline’s physicians discharged her from the hospital.  
Shortly thereafter, she developed complications that eventually necessitated the 
amputation of her right leg.  The state court of appeal reversed a jury verdict in 
Mrs. Wickline’s favor, concluding that the cost limitation decision did not 
“corrupt medical judgment.”149  In reaching its decision, the court noted that 
payers could be held “legally accountable when medically inappropriate 
decisions result from defects in the design or implementation of cost 
containment mechanisms” but that physicians who complied without protest 
with limitations imposed by third-party payers’ decisions “cannot avoid 
ultimate responsibility for harm suffered by the patient.”150 
MediCal’s payment determination undisputedly changed the treating 
physician’s decision about when to discharge Mrs. Wickline from the hospital.  
“Corrupt,” the term used by the appellate court, however, has a decidedly 
negative connotation: not merely to change, but to change from good and 
sound to bad or unsound.151  The court concluded that the physician’s 
discharge decision, while changed as a result of the denial of payment, was not 
itself negligent.152  Accordingly, the court was not forced by the facts and 
procedural posture to operationalize this vernacular term into a legal standard.  
Perhaps because of its conclusion that the discharge decision was not 
negligent, the court did not evaluate in any detail the “design or 
 
 148. Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
 149. Id. at 820. 
 150. The court was later to repudiate this statement in Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 271 
Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).  The court characterized the Wickline court’s statement about 
a treating physician’s ultimate responsibility as dicta, and rejected it, holding that a treating 
physician would not have sole liability for harm caused by a hospital discharge that resulted from 
the payer’s decision not to approve payment.  Id. at 879.  The Wilson court’s approach is 
consistent with the tort doctrine of joint and several liability. 
 151. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “corrupt” as “to change from 
good to bad” or “to degrade with unsound principles.”  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 512 (1993). 
 152. However, this finding was not fully litigated.  The only physicians who testified at trial 
were physicians associated with the MediCal program and Mrs. Wickline’s own physicians. 
Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 815. Neither group was likely to testify that the care provided was 
substandard, even though the treating physicians maintained that it was not optimal and that the 
deficit in care caused Mrs. Wickline’s injury.  Id. at 815-16. 
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implementation” of MediCal’s cost containment mechanisms, to explain why 
they were or were not “defective” or what would constitute an actionable 
defect. 
The uncertainties reflected in the Wickline case were not resolved by a 
subsequent California decision, Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern California, 
which allowed a similar set of facts to go to trial.153  That decision reasoned 
that liability would exist if the plaintiff proved that a utilization review firm 
improperly denied coverage for psychiatric hospitalization and if this denial 
was a “substantial factor” in causing the patient’s suicide.  However, the key 
fact on which the allegation of illegality was based is unlikely to recur: the 
insurance contract at issue seemingly failed entirely to authorize utilization 
review or the delegation of utilization review to a third party,154 a defect that, if 
true, could be, and has been, quickly fixed in future insurance contracts.  This 
case too sheds little light on what types of defects in process will give rise to 
tort liability.  Moreover, the decision is silent about the standard of medical 
care that gives rise to liability, since no facts had been developed to indicate 
whether the care that was provided was negligent. 
Despite these shortcomings, Wickline and Wilson can provide an analytical 
framework for articulating the standard of care for managed care liability.  
They indicate that we need to consider both a substantive professional standard 
regarding the quality of medical care that was delivered (that is, whether 
medical judgment was “corrupted”), and a more procedural standard of how 
the insurer went about deciding whether to pay for the requested treatment.  
Each standard of care formulation has both sound underpinnings and 
significant shortfalls in assessing individual coverage decisions that are based 
on clinical factors.  Accordingly, the following two sections analyze alternative 
ways to articulate a standard based on substance and one based on process, and 
concludes by considering how the two types of standards should relate to each 
other. 
B. The Professional Medical Standard 
1. Influencing or Arranging for Negligent Care 
Mrs. Wickline’s attending physicians testified that if she had remained in 
the hospital, the complication following surgery would have been identified 
more promptly and her leg could have been saved by surgical intervention.155  
That a better medical outcome might have resulted, of course, is not the test for 
 
 153. Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 876.  The patient committed suicide after the insurer’s 
utilization review firm refused to authorize extending his stay in a psychiatric hospital to the full 
thirty days requested by his physician and covered by his insurance.  Id. at 877-78. 
 154. Id. at 880-81. 
 155. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 816. 
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medical negligence.  Rather, the usual question is whether the physician 
complied with minimally acceptable professional medical standards.  In 
Wickline, the court accepted the medical testimony that a four-day extension of 
the patient stay satisfied the prevailing standard of care, although a longer 
extension might have been optimal and might have prevented the 
amputation.156  The court held that MediCal was not liable as a “matter of 
law.”157  Is this the correct result? 
In our view, the standard of care depends on whether the gravamen of the 
complaint is the health insurer’s refusal to pay for covered benefits, or instead 
whether the plaintiff claims that the health insurer influenced or interfered with 
the independent medical judgment of treating physicians.  Wickline had 
elements of both, but the court focused more on the latter than on the former.  
Although MediCal initially approved only four days rather than the eight days 
requested, the treating physicians failed to ask for an extension when the four 
days expired, feeling this would be futile considering how MediCal conducted 
its utilization review activities.  Therefore, the court framed the issue as “the 
legal responsibility that a third party payor . . . has for harm caused to a patient 
when a cost containment program is applied in a manner which is alleged to 
have affected the implementation of the treating physician’s medical 
judgment”158 and “the effect of cost containment programs upon the 
professional judgment of physicians to prescribe.”159  In short, the court 
focused on whether the payer had “corrupted” physicians’ medical judgment. 
Framed this way, it is correct to apply a medical professional standard of 
care.  There is no basis for holding the health insurer to a higher standard of 
care than the physicians themselves.  This is the essence of the principle that 
applies to hospitals when they allow unqualified physicians onto their medical 
staffs.  Hospitals are not held to a standard of strict liability for any less-than-
ideal outcome for patients of unqualified physicians.  Instead, liability attaches 
only when such physicians themselves commit malpractice.160  Similarly, a 
managed care function that results in a clinical course of conduct that is not 
negligent should not be actionable merely because of a bad outcome.  Some 
bad outcomes are inherent risks of treatment procedures, and others, while 
avoidable, are not ipso facto the result of negligence.  If a treatment 
recommendation would not have been negligent, then that same 
recommendation couched as a coverage determination should not be 
 
 156. The Wilson Court, in an attempt to clarify the opinion in Wickline, stated that the court 
there found “as a matter of law, the discharge decision met the standard of care for physicians.”  
271 Cal. Rptr. at 879. 
 157. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 820. 
 158. Id. at 811, 820. 
 159. Id. at 811. 
 160. MARK A. HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 441 (forthcoming 6th ed. 
2003). 
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considered a breach of duty merely because it is different from the physician’s 
initial recommendation, unless the health plan has actually promised a higher 
standard of care. 
Several courts have indicated that the medical standard of care will be 
applied to managed care organizations when they are acting as providers or 
arrangers of health care services.161  This, in essence, creates a “case within a 
case,” since, to find the health insurer liable, it is necessary first to show that 
the treating physicians or other care providers were negligent, and then 
establish the legal basis for holding the health insurer responsible for this 
negligence.  The standard for evaluating the quality of care that patients 
receive is not the hard question, however.  Instead, courts need to decide what 
conditions justify holding the health insurer responsible.  When a health 
insurer is held responsible vicariously for the care provided by caregivers, the 
issue is not so much a standard of care question as it is an application of 
principles of agency, a complex and subtle topic that is not our primary focus 
in this article.  Instead, we are focusing on liability arising from denial of 
coverage based on judgmental factors involving clinical determinations. 
Simply denying coverage as legally permitted by the terms of the insurance 
policy should not, standing alone, constitute grounds for holding health 
insurers liable when patients receive substandard care.  Some other basis for 
legal responsibility would need to be established, such as actual or ostensible 
agency.  This is an obvious point if the denial of coverage is based on clear and 
absolute terms, such as limiting coverage for psychiatric hospitalization to 
thirty days a year.  If this limitation in coverage were to influence a physician 
or hospital to cease treatment that is medically required by the minimum 
standard of care,162 there is no doubt that only the provider would be 
responsible.  Doubt arises only when the insurer’s coverage limitation is not 
certain because it is written in judgmental terms, such as “medically 
necessary,” that are subject to differences of opinion.  We next consider what 
standard should govern interpretation of these terms.163 
 
 161. See, e.g., Hammerich v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1285 (M.D. 
Fla. 2002) (when an HMO is acting as a health care provider, it is subject to the prevailing 
standard of care); Morton v. Mylar Pharmaceuticals, No. 99-4896, 2000 WL 340196 (E.D. Pa. 
2000) (same); Tiemann v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 585, 598 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (same); 
In re U.S. Healthcare, 193 F.3d 151, 164-65 (3d Cir. 1999) (allegation that HMO breached the 
medical standard of care when it failed to arrange for a nurse in a timely fashion). 
 162. See, e.g., Muse v. Charter Hosp. of Winston-Salem, Inc., 452 S.E.2d 589, 595 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1995) (finding a psychiatric hospital liable for discharging a suicidal patient because his 
insurance coverage ran out). 
 163. We assume for purposes of the following discussion that the insurer was both 
contractually entitled to limit coverage to medically necessary services and entitled to make the 
medical necessity determination. 
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2. Denying Coverage for Medically Necessary Care 
When the dispute centers on whether the insurer was legally authorized to 
deny coverage, the argument is stronger for invoking a professional medical 
standard if the operative coverage concepts are ones such as medically 
necessary or experimental, which by their own terms invoke professional 
medical norms.  Managed care organizations retain the services of physicians 
to make these judgmental determinations, and these physicians have been 
found to be “practicing medicine” when they serve in this utilization review 
capacity.164  Under normal agency principles, managed care organizations 
would be responsible when their physician-agents make legally actionable 
errors in coverage decisions that require medical training and experience.  The 
argument, then, is that the validity of coverage decisions based on judgmental 
medical criteria should be determined by the same standard of care as that 
which is applied to treating physicians.  This would bring physician liability 
and insurer liability into sync, avoiding the difficulty that arises when 
physicians are forced by their liability considerations to provide care that 
insurance will not cover. 
This argument has superficial appeal, but it deceptively conflates two types 
of liability for coverage denials: contractual and tort.  If the question is how to 
interpret medical necessity and similar terms for purposes of claiming 
contractual benefits, then certainly a minimum professional medical standard 
should apply.  Indeed, some regulators and legislatures have gone much further 
to require that an optimal or maximal professional standard should govern 
insurance contract enforcement, rather than a minimally acceptable 
professional standard.165  Under this stance, if there is a legitimate difference 
of opinion between the insurer’s physician and the treating physician  (e.g., 
four vs. eight days of hospitalization), both of which are supported by 
scientific evidence or professional opinion, it is the treating physician’s 
judgment that should govern.166  Others are highly critical of this limitation on 
the freedom to contract for alternative and more cost-effective styles of 
medical practice.167 
 
 164. See Murphy v. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 949 P.2d 530, 535 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); State Bd. 
of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Fallon, 41 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Mo. 2001) (en banc). 
 165. Frank A. Sloan & Mark A. Hall, Market Failures and the Evolution of State Regulation 
of Managed Care, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2002, at 169. 
 166. Sara Rosenbaum et al., Who Should Determine When Health Care Is Medically 
Necessary?, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 229, 232 (1999). 
 167. E.g., Clark C. Havighurst, The Backlash Against Managed Health Care: Hard Politics 
Make Bad Policy, 34 IND. L. REV. 395, 398 (2001).  Based on our interviews, however, health 
insurers for the most part appear willing to live with this heightened contract standard as the price 
for making peace with the public, in response to the managed care backlash.  Most health plan 
executives interviewed in this study did not complain that mandatory definitions and 
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The issue here, however, is not simply how best to interpret the insurance 
contract or which benefits insurers should be required to cover.  Instead, the 
issue is whether personal injury and punitive damages should be awarded for 
harm resulting from the illegal refusal of covered benefits.  Both kinds of 
disputes, the one sounding in contract and the other in tort, turn on the 
application of medical judgment through terms such as “medically necessary.”  
Nevertheless, a medical professional standard is not the correct standard for 
determining tort liability.  Although using medical custom as the measure of 
the duty owed by managed care organizations has some intuitive appeal, a 
close examination reveals factual inaccuracies, doctrinal weakness and 
procedural problems with the use of this substantive standard. 
First, the analogy between managing care and practicing medicine is not a 
perfect one.168  Physicians examine patients and make differential diagnoses; 
they discuss treatment options and attendant risks with their patients in 
deciding on a course of treatment; and they rely on technical skills to perform 
diagnostic testing and treatment.  Managed care organizations and the 
physician-agents who make clinically based coverage determinations on their 
behalf do none of these things.169  Therefore, if managed care organizations are 
practicing medicine, they are doing so within a much narrower range of 
professional responsibilities.  A decoy looks a lot like a duck; it serves a useful 
purpose; but it cannot be expected to quack and lay eggs.  How well it fulfills 
its function might be better judged by a closer examination of what that 
function is.  The same could be said of managed care organizations that engage 
the services of clinicians to make coverage determinations but not to diagnose, 
advise and treat. 
Reliance on medical custom as the standard of care has been questioned 
even in the cases in which it has its origins, those involving allegations of 
medical malpractice against treating physicians.  “Medical custom” as a legal 
standard of care is based on a fallacy: that there exists one single correct 
medical response to every clinical problem and moreover that this single 
correct response is, and should be, determined without reference to cost.170  
The one-right-way approach has necessitated the evolution of additional legal 
 
interpretations of medical necessity unduly hampered their cost containment objectives or their 
contractual options in the marketplace. 
 168. Mark Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care 
Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 439-40 (1988). 
 169. They have even fewer attributes of a true treatment relationship than do physicians who 
examine patients for employment purposes, for instance, and these employment physicals have 
been held not to create a professional duty of care.  Payne v. Sherrer, 458 S.E.2d 916, 917 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1995). 
 170. See James F. Blumstein, The Legal Liability Regime: How Well Is It Doing in Assuring 
Quality, Accounting for Costs, and Coping with an Evolving Reality in the Healthcare 
Marketplace?, 11 ANNALS HEALTH L. 125, 130-31 (2002). 
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doctrines, including the respectable minority and two schools of thought rule, 
to account for this clinical reality.171  The cost-is-no-object aspect of medical 
custom causes medical malpractice law to deviate from the wider body of tort 
law that encompasses a risk-utility analysis.  In a recent body of work, 
Professor Philip Peters has shown that judicial deference to medical custom is 
eroding in favor of traditional tort principles of reasonable care under the 
circumstances presented.172  Whether juries will consider cost as one of the 
circumstances remains to be seen.  Therefore, this area of law would not be 
well served by expanding an uncertain and questionable common law doctrine 
to an increasing circle of actors. 
More troubling still is the possibility that applying a medical professional 
standard would result in holding health insurers liable for tort damages for 
honest differences of opinion, when juries might conclude that damage resulted 
from the insurer initially opting for the less protective of two professionally 
justifiable courses of action.  Studies document that medical custom often 
varies over a surprisingly wide range, sometime much wider even than the four 
vs. eight days of hospitalization in Wickline.173  Many or most tort suits for 
denial of coverage would come to court only after the question of contract 
interpretation has been resolved through administrative appeal mechanisms, 
such as the external review process discussed above.174  These contract 
disputes are likely to be governed by a more demanding version of medical 
custom, such as the optimal or maximal professional standard.  Having 
established entitlement to coverage under this standard for contract 
interpretation, it would be very difficult, applying a similar standard, for juries 
to then distinguish the lower, minimally acceptable level of care that governs a 
suit for tort damages.  In theory, health insurers would be entitled to argue 
what is essentially a “respectable minority” or “two schools of thought” rule.  
However, framing the tort issues this way tends to improperly shift the burden 
of proof regarding the standard of care to the insurer since the plaintiff’s prima 
facie case will appear to have been established by the victory in the contract 
dispute, only under a more demanding version of a custom standard.  
Moreover, courts in some jurisdictions might allow juries to reach their own 
 
 171. See generally Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. The Business 
Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 586, 587 (1994). 
 172. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at 
the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 164 (2000) (tracing the erosion of medical custom 
as the legal standard of care); Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the Jury in Modern Malpractice 
Law, 87 IOWA L. REV. 909, 911 (2002) (the role of jury when medical custom does not define the 
legal standard of care). 
 173. See John E. Wennberg & Philip G. Peters, Jr., Unwarranted Variations In The Quality 
Of Health Care: Can The Law Help Medicine Provide A Remedy/Remedies?, 37 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 925 (2002). 
 174. See supra text accompanying note 144. 
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conclusions on the contract coverage issue, even when the external reviewer 
has ruled in favor of the health insurer.  In our interviews, one health plan 
lawyer noted that this would constitute virtual strict liability for any harm 
caused by a coverage denial with which an external review physician or jury 
happens to disagree.  She argued forcefully, “you can’t run a business that 
way.” 
If minimally acceptable medical custom were to be the gauge of tort 
liability, courts would have to take special care to ensure the independence, 
expertise and lack of bias of the physicians who asked to testify about the 
decisions of managed care organizations.175  As Wickline illustrates, physicians 
might ratchet up their views of what constitutes minimally acceptable care as a 
means to push back against managed care restraints.  Courts might be better 
served by objective evidentiary sources, including scientifically valid, current 
clinical guidelines or Medicare standards based as much as feasible on medical 
outcomes. 
As Professor Morreim observes,176 a clinically based coverage 
determination is more accurately characterized as a medical resource decision 
than a medical treatment determination.  In managed care cases, juries are 
asked to determine the reasonableness of a resource allocation decision, also 
known as a medical rationing decision.  This is a class of decisions that this 
nation has taken great pains to hide from public view177 and that is ill suited for 
judicial resolution.178  Judges, therefore, will also have to take special care to 
guard against hindsight bias as a result of the backlash against the managed 
care, especially if the medical profession and the managed-care industry are 
permitted to play out their power struggle in the courtroom.179 
In the final analysis, the strongest argument for applying a medical 
professional standard of care is the following doctrinal argument: the insurance 
contract invokes medical professional concepts in defining coverage, and any 
 
 175. For a discussion and example of the risk of practicing physician bias against managed 
care decision-makers brought to fruition, see Gail B. Agrawal, Resuscitating Professionalism: 
Self-Regulation in the Medical Marketplace, 66 MO. L. REV. 341, 400-05 (2001) (discussing 
Murphy v. Board of Medical Examiners, 949 P.2d 530 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997)). 
 176. MORREIM, supra note 146. 
 177. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978); 
Orentlicher, supra note 94. 
 178. Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers’ Assessment of Medical Necessity, 
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1711-12 (1992); Am. Med. Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 
1997).  “Despite rumors to the contrary, those who wear judicial robes are human beings, and as 
persons, are inspired and motivated by compassion as anyone would be. . . . The temptation to go 
about, doing good where we see fit, and to make things less difficult for those who come before 
us, regardless of the law, is strong.”  Bechtold v. Physicians Health Plan of Northern Indiana, 19 
F.3d 322, 324 n.3 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 179. See Randall R. Bovbjerg  & Robert H. Miller, Managed Care and Medical Injury: Let’s 
Not Throw Out the Baby with the Backlash, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1145 (1999). 
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error in applying these terms that results in injury should be compensated 
according to the normal rules for consequential personal injury damages that 
flow from the breach of contractual obligations.  This is a substantial 
argument.  The major objection is the feasibility of distinguishing between the 
minimally acceptable professional standard that should govern personal injury 
damages and the higher standard of optimal care that tends to influence 
coverage determinations.  A jury trial is not institutionally well suited to make 
this differentiation reliably. 
Moreover, there appears from our interviews to be no pressing need or 
desire to sue health insurers in these circumstances simply in order to have a 
solvent source of compensation for patients’ injuries.180  This does not serve 
the deterrence function, but that might be advanced either in third party claims 
brought by physicians against insurers, or by punitive damages suits against 
insurers when their departure from contractual standards was egregious.  
Plaintiffs’ lawyers we interviewed also acknowledged that obtaining punitive 
damages is the major strategic reason to add a health insurer to what otherwise 
is an ordinary medical malpractice suit against the physician.  However, 
punitive damages point more to the bad faith concept from insurance law, a 
different standard of care, one that is based more on the process of making 
coverage decisions than on the substance of the medical judgment rendered.  
Indeed, it is conceivable that violation of a process standard might result in 
liability for bad medical outcomes even if the treatment rendered is not 
professionally substandard.  Therefore, we next turn to different formulations 
of a process standard of managed care liability. 
C. Process-based Standard of Good Faith in Following Contractual 
Standards 
The absence of established legal doctrine presents an opportunity for the 
law to develop in ways that respond to the present day realities of the medical 
marketplace.  Medical custom is a product of a legal system that blamed 
individual decision-makers for wrongful results, while contemporary thinking 
is that errors are more likely to be prevented through a systems approach.181  
State and federal law support control of health care spending and cost 
conscious clinical decision-making.182  In the present-day cost-constrained 
 
 180. As discussed above, when liability turns in any event on showing that substandard care 
was delivered, most of the plaintiffs’ lawyers we interviewed think it makes the case 
unnecessarily complex and expensive to sue both the physicians and the insurer, so they prefer to 
sue only the physician. 
 181. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Paths to Reducing Medical Injury: Professional Liability 
and Discipline vs. Patient Safety—and the Need for a Third Way, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 369 
(2001) (good process prevents more errors than individual sanction). 
 182. The court in Wilson explained that the result in Wickline should be attributed to a 
“clearly expressed public policy in the California [statutes] which mandated the use of a 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] WHAT IF YOU COULD SUE YOUR HMO? 289 
environment, which lacks a viable alternative to the managed-care industry to 
control spending, the risks of hindsight bias and the potential chilling effect on 
efforts to contain costs point to a standard of care that can provide a 
prospective and concise guide to industry conduct.  Taken together, these 
factors support the development of a procedural standard of care as a means to 
assess the conduct of a managed care organization implementing a cost-quality 
tradeoff through a clinically based coverage determination. 
A process-based standard would evaluate both the substance and the 
process of the insurer’s coverage determination.  Tort-type liability would 
attach, not simply for any decision that later was determined to be incorrect as 
a matter of contract or statutory law, but instead, in the words of Wickline, only 
if an incorrect coverage decision was caused by “defects in the design or 
implementation of the [coverage determination] mechanisms.”183  This begs 
the question of what the standard of care should be for the process of making 
coverage determinations that depend on medical criteria and judgment.  We 
will explore two possibilities: industry custom, or a reasonable person 
standard. 
To illustrate, in Wickline, a registered nurse employed by the payer 
reviewed a standard form setting forth the treating physician’s reasons for 
requesting an extended stay.184  When the nurse could not approve the request 
under the payer’s guidelines, the nurse referred it to the next available 
physician reviewer, and physician reviewers were assigned cases for review 
without regard to the nature of the patient’s problem or the reviewer’s field of 
expertise.185  In Mrs. Wickline’s case, the decision to authorize half the 
extended stay requested by the attending physician was made by a general 
surgeon solely on the basis of a telephone call with the nurse-reviewer, without 
review of the completed form, the patient’s record or consultation with the 
attending physician or a vascular surgeon with expertise in conditions like the 
one from which Mrs. Wickline suffered.186  The physician-reviewer testified 
later that he must have concluded that Mrs. Wickline was progressing 
satisfactorily because the standard form did not contain any information about 
 
utilization review process,” and to a state statute that “provided for the denial of benefits . . . 
when to do so was ‘in accordance with the usual standards of medical practice in the 
community.’”  Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 884 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) 
(citation omitted).  A clearly expressed public policy in favor of utilization management and cost 
control does not differentiate Wickline from any contemporary managed-care liability case.  The 
Federal Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 and states’ HMO acts authorize utilization 
review and other managed care practices and provide persuasive evidence of a public policy in 
favor of cost containment in health care.  See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 417.103(b) (1998) (mandating that 
federally qualified HMOs have “effective procedures to monitor utilization and control cost”). 
 183. Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
 184. Id. at 813-14. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
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abnormalities in her temperature, her diet or her bowel function, none of which 
are necessarily implicated as complications of vascular surgery.187  From the 
absence of this information, the physician-reviewer testified he probably 
concluded that all must be normal and, therefore, that she must be progressing 
satisfactorily.188 Although there were places on the form to indicate the 
recommendation and the reason for disapproval, they were left blank.189  There 
were no contemporaneously created records to memorialize the physician-
reviewer’s clinical conclusions on the basis for them, and he said he did not 
have clear recall of the case.190 
It is, at least, debatable that this process was defective in design or 
implementation.  The question, however, is according to what standard?  
Under an industry custom, Medicaid might be absolved if it followed what it 
and other Medicaid or private utilization review firms usually do.  Under the 
reasonable person standard, the state would need to convince a jury that this is 
an acceptable way to run a utilization review program.  We analyze both 
possibilities. 
1. Industry Custom 
An industry custom standard is suggested by extension from physician 
liability.  Because this is the approach generally taken for matters of liability 
relating to medical care, it might make sense to judge managed care practices 
according to what most other managed care plans usually do, constrained as 
they are by market forces and regulatory oversight.  For instance, Jones v. 
Chicago HMO Ltd. of Illinois envisioned the adoption of a managed-care 
industry standard, by noting that an HMO fulfills its duty of care when it acts 
as a “reasonably careful” HMO would under the circumstances.191 
It is important to recognize, however, that defining the standard of care by 
prevailing custom is a rarity in tort law generally.192  The reasonably-prudent-
actor standard guards against a race to the bottom that could result from 
collective adoption of unreasonable customs.  The factors that support an 
exception for physician negligence do not apply very strongly to insurers’ 
processes for making coverage decisions.193  Judging physicians by medical 
 
 187. Id. 
 188. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr at 814. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1128 (Ill. 2000). 
 192. See, e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 
(1932) (“a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices”). 
 193. We stress that this analysis applies only to the process component of the standard.  
Elsewhere, one of us maintains that the substance of what constitutes minimally acceptable 
medical care should be allowed to evolve according to professional, and perhaps industry, 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] WHAT IF YOU COULD SUE YOUR HMO? 291 
custom is sometimes attributed to the complexity of medical practice and the 
layperson’s difficulty in assessing it, and coverage determinations are also 
complex and technical enterprises, but this argument proves too much.  Other 
complex human endeavors outside common knowledge, like structural 
engineering and industrial design, do not enjoy such judicial deference. 
Deferring to collective medical judgment can be explained more accurately 
by a historical social judgment about physicians’ selfless commitment to 
patient welfare and public service.194  Regardless of whether extra space that 
social judgment was ever sound for physicians, the managed care industry 
cannot plausibly proclaim a single focused, other-serving mission.  Instead, 
health insurers have multiple competing loyalties—to patients’ economic as 
well as medical interests, to employer purchasers as well as patient members 
and to shareholders as well as customers.  These conflicting duties to multiple 
stakeholders counsel against a standard that defers blindly to industry custom, 
especially custom defined the way it is for physicians, namely, the lowest 
common denominator among a range of professional practices and opinions. 
Rejecting an industry custom standard is consistent with other choices the 
law has made with respect to the regulation of medical practice.  The privilege 
of self-regulation had been historically afforded to the medical and legal 
professions as one means of legal oversight of their activities.  The American 
Medical Association promulgated the first formal code of medical ethics in 
1847.195  And, every state has established a state medical board, typically 
dominated by physician members, to oversee the practice of medicine within 
its borders.196  In contrast, self-regulation within the managed-care industry has 
a short history; the National Committee for Quality Assurance conducted its 
first site visits in the early 1990s.197  And, the industry’s voluntary 
accreditation efforts have not been afforded self-regulatory status.  In contrast 
to the medical profession, outside regulatory scrutiny is the legal norm for the 
managed care industry.198 
Reliance on professional custom and self-regulation is based on public 
trust that the self-regulating profession will set high standards and that the risk 
 
custom.  See Mark A. Hall, The Malpractice Standard Under Health Care Cost Containment, 17 
LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 347 (1989). 
 194. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at 
the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 193-95 (2000) (recounting the historical basis for 
medical custom in tort law). 
 195. Sheldon F. Kurtz, The Law of Informed Consent: From “Doctor Is Right” to “ Patient 
Has Rights”, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1243, 1244 (2000). 
 196. See generally CARL F. AMERINGER, STATE MEDICAL BOARDS AND THE POLITICS OF 
PUBLIC PROTECTION (1999). 
 197. For a history of NCQA, see its website, at www.ncqa.org (last visited October 4, 2002). 
 198. Most states give the department of insurance regulatory authority over managed care 
organizations.  See Sloan & Hall, supra note 165. 
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of professional sanction will cause individuals to comply voluntarily with 
professional norms to avoid social sanction.199  The managed care industry is 
not afforded the degree of public or individual trust that characterizes the 
medical profession.200  Bureaucracy does not engender a sense of public 
confidence or individual trust.  The individually unidentifiable corporate 
constituents that determine corporate conduct have less to fear from individual 
social sanction than to personal physicians and, therefore, are likely to be less 
motivated by these psychological and reputational forces. 
Finally, the argument that market forces will assure that industry behavior 
is, on the whole, reasonable does not carry as much weight in this setting as it 
might in other consumer-driven markets.  This is true not only due to the 
difficulty consumers have in evaluating these complex issues, but also because 
of the agency problems introduced when purchasing decisions are made by 
someone other than those who receive the services: employers vs. 
employees.201 
2. Process-based reasonable person standard 
Rather than an open-ended “reasonable person” standard, we proposed the 
following process standard: 
A managed care organization would be liable for its share of a patient’s injury 
caused by an incorrect coverage denial only if the plaintiff proved that the 
applicable cost containment procedure was (a) not designed to acquire and 
consider relevant clinical factors or to base coverage determinations on one or 
more sources of externally developed, scientifically valid, current medical 
information, or (b) the cost containment procedure otherwise meeting (a) was 
not implemented substantially according to its own terms,202 and (c) the 
coverage determination was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s harm. 
This more precise formulation of a standard of care sets more workable 
constraints on juror discretion than an unbounded “reasonableness” 
standard.203 
The proposed standard is designed to facilitate good decisions by requiring 
good procedure.204  Factors indicating good procedure might include reliance 
 
 199. See Peters, supra note 194. 
 200. Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 516 (2002).  
 201. Sloan & Hall, supra note 165. 
 202. Non-material deviations should not be punished. 
 203. See Jeffrey O’Connell & Andrew S. Boutros, Treating Medical Malpractice Claims 
Under a Variant of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 373, 424-25 (2002) 
(making an analogous suggestion about lowering the standard of care or raising the standard of 
proof in medical malpractice cases). 
 204. See Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of 
Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 677 (2002) 
(better decision making procedures increases the likelihood of a better outcome). 
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on a decision maker with competence and training in the relevant practice area, 
or in the absence of expertise, consultation with an expert; consideration of 
patient-specific factors including relevant medical records and other 
reasonably available sources of medical information; and sharing of clinical 
criteria and reasons for coverage denials with the attending physician to ensure 
a full and fair consideration of the patient’s medical needs.  State legislatures 
that prefer not to leave development of procedural standards to the common 
law could adopt statutory standards or empower a state agency to establish 
procedures.205 These statutes might follow the model of the Health Care 
Quality Improvement Act of 1986 that encouraged peer review and due 
process in medical staff decision making by conditioning a qualified immunity 
on compliance with statutory standards or their functional equivalent and an 
absence of evidence of bad faith.206  They might also provide a deemed status 
for those managed care organizations that are accredited by a specified national 
private accrediting agency, much as the federal Medicare program permits 
hospitals to prove their compliance with the program’s conditions of 
participation through accreditation by the Joint Commission on Healthcare 
Organizations.207Other possible sources for safe harbor protection include 
Department of Labor regulations under ERISA and regulations governing 
Medicare HMOs.208 
The proposed standard encourages not only the adoption of good 
procedures, but compliance with those procedures in individual cases.  Good 
procedures will not shield a managed care organization that does not follow 
them, absent justification for deviating in a particular case.  Inadvertent or 
unjustified failure to follow applicable procedures gives rise to compensatory 
damages.  Moreover, proof of bad faith non-compliance with established 
procedures or reckless disregard for a patient’s medical needs could give rise 
to punitive damages.209  However, health plan managers should have 
reasonable leeway to respond in good faith to unusual situations by deviating 
 
 205. The plight of national managed care organizations would be eased considerably by a 
federal enactment of standards for cost containment procedures, but Congress’s inability to enact 
major health legislation make this course unlikely. 
 206. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (2000). 
 207. HALL ET AL., supra note 160, at 1094. 
 208. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974; Rules and Regulations for 
Administration and Enforcement; Claims Procedure, 63 Fed. Reg. 48390 (Sept. 9, 1998) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2560); see also Medicare Program; Establishment of an Expedited 
Review Process for Medicare Beneficiaries Enrolled in Health Maintenance Organizations, 
Competitive Medical Plans, and Health Care Prepayment Plans, 62 Fed. Reg. 23368 (Apr. 30, 
1997) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 417). 
 209. Cf. Poling v. Wis. Physicians Serv., 357 N.W.2d 293, 297 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) 
(evidence showed wanton disregard of duty by plan administrator); Hughes v. Blue Cross of N. 
Cal., 263 Cal. Rptr. 850 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (insurer breached covenant of good faith by failing 
to investigate claim and using standard significantly at variance with community standard). 
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from normal procedures when this is appropriate.  The proposed standard is 
intended to allow for this flexibility. 
The causal element of the proposed standard, and the reference to shared 
liability, are intended to reflect the limited scope of the managed-care 
organization’s duty with respect to determining the actual care that patients 
receive.210  If the coverage determination does not alter the clinical course, the 
requisite causation would not be proved.  Also, courts will have to assess the 
probability that a requested medical intervention would have produced a better 
outcome.  Finally, as Wickline held, if the ultimate course of treatment was 
substandard, the treating physician will share in the ultimate responsibility.  
These elements reflect that clinically based coverage determinations, no less 
than treatment decisions, are complex and uncertain, and are part of a web of 
decisional authority over what treatment patients ultimately receive. 
How might this approach work in practice?  In Wickline, the only evidence 
on this issue that is revealed in the appellate opinion is testimony that is biased, 
or at least self-interested.  One of Mrs. Wickline’s treating physicians testified 
that “the Medi-Cal Consultant’s rejection of the requested eight-day 
extension . . . and his authorization of a four-day extension in its place did not 
conform to the usual medical standards,” and that “in accordance with those 
standards, a physician would not be permitted to make decisions regarding the 
care of a patient without either first seeing the patient, reviewing the patient’s 
chart or discussing the patient’s condition with her treating physician.”211 The 
treating physician, of course, was not disinterested and nothing in the reported 
opinion suggested that he was qualified as an expert in utilization review 
procedures.  In contrast, the Chief Medi-Cal Consultant testified that “it was 
the practice . . . for Medi-Cal Consultants not to review other information 
[beyond that contained on the standard form]” and that “Medi-Cal Consultants 
did not initiate telephone calls to patient’s treatment doctors because of the 
volume of work.”212  The Medi-Cal consultant, whose testimony might provide 
some evidence of industry standards, also had a stake in the litigation.  There 
was seemingly no evidence or testimony from unbiased, objective expert 
witnesses concerning whether the procedures used by the state Medicaid 
program, in reaching its decision to approve half the requested extension of 
hospital stay, were consistent with the standard of a reasonably prudent third-
party payer conducting prospective utilization review. 
Better sources of evidence would include standards of practice drawn from 
regulatory and accreditation sources.  This is how courts, for instance, 
determine the process standards for hospitals alleged to have negligently 
approved the credentials of physicians applying for medical staff 
 
 210. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text. 
 211. Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 817 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
 212. Id. at 818. 
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membership.213  In Wickline, the state Medicaid cost containment program 
would not appear to satisfy contemporary voluntary accreditation standards 
established by the National Committee for Quality Assurance, the principal 
accrediting agency for managed-care organizations.214  Those standards would 
have required that the physician-reviewer consider “relevant clinical 
information and consult[] with the treating physician.”215  They would also 
require that the reasons for the denial be communicated to the physician and 
the patient and documented by the reviewer.216  There should also have been a 
procedure in place for the general surgeon physician-reviewer to consult, if 
necessary, with a board-certified vascular surgeon in making the determination 
to deny the treating physician’s request.217 
However formulated and administered, a reasonableness standard for the 
process of coverage determinations should not allow second-guessing or 
hindsight bias of coverage guidelines and criteria that are based on sound 
medical evidence simply because they take into account the cost as well as the 
effectiveness of proposed and alternative treatments.  While cost-effectiveness 
is a legitimate and appropriate factor in determining insurance coverage, we 
envision that clinically based coverage policy will also have some basis of 
medical or scientific legitimacy.218  The process standard we propose here is 
intended to encourage the use of sound decision-making criteria as part of 
sound procedures.  Therefore, the standard should not be satisfied by coverage 
criteria that are based solely or primarily on cost considerations unless the 
criteria can be supported by some scientific evidence when it is reasonably 
available, or informed unbiased medical opinion if it is not.  However, the 
 
 213. See, e.g., Johnson v. Misericordia Comty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1981). 
 214. The National Committee for Quality Assurance began its operations in 1990, and 
conducted its first accreditation site visits in 1991.  See http://www.ncqa.org/about/timeline.htm 
(last visited October 4, 2002). 
 215. NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE, STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION 
OF MCOS 55 (1999) (Standard UM 5). 
 216. Id. at 56 (Standards UM 6 and 6.1).  
 217. Id. at 53 (Standard UM 3). 
 218. Clinical guidelines vary widely in the rigor applied to their development.  Some have 
been developed solely for payment purposes, to demand as well as to deny insurance coverage.  
See NATIONAL HEALTH LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, COLLOQUIUM REPORT ON LEGAL ISSUES 
RELATED TO CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES 12-14, 21-27 (1995) (One author, Gail Agrawal, 
was a participant in this colloquium and contributed to the report.).  Some critics have charged 
that one frequently used set of managed care coverage guidelines lacks medical validity based on 
current scientific evidence or informed unbiased medical opinion.  See Laura B. Benko, Not by 
the Numbers, Please; Physicians Rebel Against Milliman & Robertson’s National Insurer Care 
Standards, MODERN HEALTHCARE, May 8, 2000, at 34  (professor of pediatric infectious diseases 
characterizes proposed pediatric-care guidelines as “outrageous” and “dangerous” and brings 
defamation and fraud action against standard issuer for listing his name as an author of them).  
Although we express no opinion on this claim, we believe that, if the allegation were proved, use 
of the challenged standard should not satisfy the standard we propose here. 
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failure to use the best available medical criteria should not be automatic 
grounds for liability.  A factfinder should not be allowed to substitute its 
judgment for that of a managed care organization choosing among acceptable 
decision-making criteria.  Beyond these caveats, we have not fully reconciled 
how this substantive component of the process standard should be articulated, 
so we leave this for the evolutionary processes of the common law. 
3. Combining the Two Standards 
In summary, a medical profession standard should govern vicarious 
liability and other theories of liability that seek to hold health insurers 
responsible for the quality of care rendered other than simply their role in 
making coverage decisions.  In such cases, the difficult issue will be what 
attributes of managed care justify holding the health insurer responsible for 
substandard care by providers.  In cases seeking personal injury damages for 
wrongful coverage determinations, however, the main focus is a process 
standard, one that looks at whether the health insurer had an acceptable system 
in place, and followed it, for making reasonable determinations of clinical 
factors that determine what the insurance policy covers.  What we finally need 
to consider is whether, in coverage decision cases, there is also a substantive 
standard.  In other words, is a breach of the process standard resulting in injury 
sufficient for tort liability, or is it also necessary to show that the care delivered 
fell below minimally acceptable professional medical standards? 
In our view, liability for coverage decisions should attach if each of the 
elements we propose is established, even if care that is rendered or that the 
insurer did approve is minimally acceptable under a professional medical 
standard.  In other words, we propose a process standard that is both necessary 
and sufficient for liability.  This is not to say that issues of substance are 
irrelevant.  It is still necessary to show that the patient was in fact entitled to 
coverage for the care that was requested.  When this question turns on medical 
criteria, then issues of medical substance will be presented, but those should be 
examined through the contract lens, in terms of what the insurance policy 
covers by its own terms.  An additional element of defective process is then 
needed to use the contract breach as a basis for tort damages.  However, tort 
damages from coverage denials do not depend on meeting a substantive tort 
standard for the quality of medical care.  In short, that the physician cannot be 
found liable for rendering substandard care should not be a defense to the 
health insurer’s independent duty to make sound coverage decisions in good 
faith. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Despite the length and complexity of this article, we have gone down only 
the first stretch of road beyond ERISA preemption.  If, due to erosion of 
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preemption, a reversal of Supreme Court precedents, or legislative enactments, 
there comes a time when indeed you can sue your HMO, the basic theory of 
liability and the core standard of care will be only the first two questions one 
must answer.  Courts will also need to wrestle with allocating liability between 
physicians and insurers, and, even more problematic, between insurers and 
employers, especially employers who choose to retain authority over managed 
care functions.  This article does not touch, or only scratches the surface of, 
these additional difficult questions.  Therefore, it falls far short of a complete 
roadmap for managed care liability. 
This article has a more modest aim.  The first step is to distinguish between 
theories that seek to hold health insurers responsible for the actions of treating 
physicians, and those that challenge the health insurer’s own decisions.  This 
distinction cannot always be clearly drawn, but maintaining it in some form is 
essential for keeping legal categories coherent.  The second is to identify cases 
that can be resolved within the four corners of the contract and those that are 
based on judgmental factors, especially factors that require medical expertise.  
Cases where health insurers wrongly deny coverage present a complex set of 
considerations.  When a contractual violation is clear, ordinary tort principles 
would impose liability for personal injury that foreseeably results, but whether 
a breach has occurred is often not clear due to the open-ended way in which 
health insurance coverage is typically defined. 
Courts have not been called on to resolve what standard should govern the 
award of tort-type damages because this path has been blocked by ERISA 
preemption, but ERISA preemption is evolving.  It is now generally conceded 
that ERISA preemption does not apply to theories of vicarious liability, and, in 
some jurisdictions, ERISA does not apply to any form of liability attacking the 
quality of care.  Even though the common law has been free to evolve along 
with the changing interpretation of ERISA preemption, little evolution has 
occurred because most trial lawyers have been reluctant to complicate medical 
malpractice cases by naming health insurers as additional defendants.219  In 
most instances, practicing lawyers think that it is not necessary or worth the 
effort to sue a managed care entity under a theory of managed care liability 
that depends in part on showing that the physician was negligent and that 
introduces the complications of an institutional defendant and the uncertainties 
of ERISA preemption. 
If the ERISA bar were lifted, new state statutes suggest a standard of 
“ordinary care,” but it is unclear whether this term refers to the substance of 
the medical judgment that is used to interpret coverage terms, or, instead, to 
the process for determining coverage.  We opt for a process standard for 
several reasons.  A medical professional standard might be correct for specific 
 
 219. Of course, there are exceptions.  Most of the lawsuits filed under the Texas right-to-sue 
law, for example, have been filed by the same lawyer.  See Robbins, supra note 136. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
298 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:235 
enforcement of insurance contracts, but it is too open to legitimate differences 
of opinion to serve as the basis for tort liability or punitive damages.  
Moreover, the medical standards that are likely to govern contract enforcement 
are much more demanding than the minimal standards used to determine 
physicians’ tort liability.  Excessive second-guessing of the substance of 
coverage decisions could over-deter insurers’ socially beneficial efforts to 
contain costs.  In contrast, evidence so far indicates that health insurers’ effort 
to improve the process of coverage determinations is a socially constructive 
response to tort law’s deterrence signal. 
A process standard would hold managed care organizations liable for 
consequential personal injury if, in determining health insurance coverage 
based on medical criteria, they use a procedure that is not designed to acquire 
and consider relevant clinical factors, or if they depart materially from normal 
procedures without adequate justification.  Following industry standards or 
meeting regulatory requirements would not constitute an absolute defense, but 
a process standard should defer heavily to well considered and unbiased social 
or governmental assessments of what are and are not acceptable managed care 
practices. 
If health insurers do not use reasonable procedures in making coverage 
decisions, they should be held responsible for the harm that results, even if the 
medical care that is rendered meets acceptable professional norms.  Health 
insurers have a duty to their members independent of the duty of treating 
physicians, and the standard of care that governs each duty is distinct.  The 
standard we propose does not hold health plans strictly accountable for 
achieving perfect results.  It does demand that health plans base medical 
judgments on medical criteria that have professional and scientific credibility. 
 
